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11 Introduction
One key feature of recent globalization trends is the growing phenomenon of international reorganization
of production and work processes, or, put differently, offshoring of jobs, which has heightened concerns
regarding job and wage cuts in many advanced countries (cf. Bhagwati et al., 2004; Snower et al., 2009).1
While earlier studies have highlighted the labor market impact of international fragmentation of the value
added chain, captured by the increasing penetration of intermediate goods (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996,
1999; Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990, 2001; Kohler, 2004a,b), recent observations accentuate the important
role of job characteristics and task content of occupations (cf. Blinder, 2009a,b). To put it in the words of
Blinder (2009b, p.54), “. . . this time it’s not the British who are coming, but the Indians. . . neither by land nor
by sea, but electronically”.
More precisely, the recent development in employment and wages depicts a polarizing trend in many
advanced countries, indicating a deflection of global competition towards the medium-skilled workforce
(Acemoglu and Autor, 2011).2 The rationale for this new trend is, on the one hand, advances in information
and communication technology (ICT), as well as declines in trade transaction and transportation costs of
goods and services that have accelerated the integration process of national markets into a global market. On
the other hand, an important factor is rapid growth in major emerging countries, such as Brazil, Russia, India,
and China (BRIC). These countries are characterized by high accumulation of human-capital and advanced
technologies as well as improvements in the economic and business infrastructure that make them highly
competitive in areas such as information technology services in which the advanced countries have been
dominant (Bhagwati et al., 2004; Snower et al., 2009; Spence, 2011).3 Both developments have reduced the
locational viability of some occupations. That is, jobs that have a high content of routine, non-interactive,
and non-cognitive tasks are most likely at peril. The rationale is that these routine-intensive job tasks can
be easily codified, enabling firms in many advanced countries to reorganize production and work processes
by decomposing the various stages of production geographically into clusters of tasks and locating each task
cluster in the countries where it is most profitable (Snower et al., 2009). Therefore the comparative advantage
of performing a specific type of job tasks has become important.
In the recent literature on offshoring job tasks, two main forces have received particular attention, in-
troduced by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg’s (2008) trade-in-tasks approach.4 While allocating jobs abroad
(offshoring) induces a direct displacement effect of domestic workers, leading to lower wages, offshoring ac-
tivities may generate a productivity effect similar to technology improvement by lowering a firm’s production
cost. This productivity effect, in turn, will lead to an expansion of output and thus raise employment and
wages. The balance between these two forces will determine the direction of the wage and employment ef-
1Blinder (2009a) estimates that 30 million to 40 million jobs in the USA are potentially offshorable, while job tasks that require face-
to-face contact as well as abstract and cognitive skills are protected. See also the studies by Jensen and Kletzer (2010) and Moncarz
et al. (2008) regarding offshorability of service occupations. For example, Moncarz et al. (2008) identify the offshorability of 160 service
occupations, where the range of occupations includes scientists, mathematicians, radiologists and editors at the high end of the market
as well as those of telephone operators, clerks and typists at the low end.
2For recent empirical evidence regarding the polarization effect in the US labor market see Autor et al. (2003); Autor and Dorn (2009,
2013); Autor et al. (2006, 2008); Firpo et al. (2011); Michaels et al. (2014); and in the European labor markets Baumgarten et al. (2013);
Dustmann et al. (2009); Goos and Manning (2007); Goos et al. (2009, 2014); Spitz-Oener (2006).
3More specifically, Bhagwati et al. (2004) highlight that the stock of skilled workers in India and China will reach about 300 million in
a few decades. Spence (2011) provides a critical discussion on globalization and labor market effects for the USA.
4A third channel, as put forward in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), is via the terms-of-trade effect that may wipe out the
productivity effect. However, see Bhagwati et al. (2004) for a discussion regarding the empirical insignificance of terms-of-trade effects
of offshoring.
2fect of offshoring (Ebenstein et al., 2014; Becker et al., 2013; Baumgarten et al., 2013; Harrison and McMillan,
2011; Hummels et al., 2014; Olney, 2012; Ottaviano et al., 2013; Wright, 2014).
However, there exists another important mechanism that shapes substantially the labor market out-
comes of offshoring: the spillover effects on other skill groups induced by job tasks mobility of offshoring-
induced displaced workers. This channel is omitted in the existing theoretical literature on offshoring and
task allocation. Our first contribution is, therefore, to address the two hypotheses regarding polarization
and productivity effects in a more general framework that accounts explicitly for several important features:
task-skill heterogeneity, endogenous offshoring, and spillover effects due to mobility across job tasks. In
doing so, we build on recent important contributions that incorporate the explicit assignment of skills to
tasks.5 In particular, we provide a theoretical framework that augments recent contributions by Acemoglu
and Autor (2011), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), and Ottaviano et al. (2013) in two ways. First, we
allow for endogenous specialization of different skill groups into a continuum of tasks. The implied match-
ing between tasks and skills allows for task competition among different skill groups and thus enables us
to jointly investigate changes in the task composition performed by different skills in the economy due to
exogenous offshoring shocks, a feature that is absent in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Ottaviano
et al. (2013).6 Second, and contrary to Acemoglu and Autor (2011), who consider offshoring exogenously, we
analyze the offshoring decision by domestic firms as an endogenous process, capturing changes at both the
intensive margin, i.e. the range of offshorable tasks, as well as the extensive margin, i.e. the offshorability of
a marginal domestic task.
Thus our theoretical framework accounts for all these different mechanisms, which have been addressed
separately in the previous literature. Particularly, several important insights can be gained from our ap-
proach. First, we show that any offshoring scenario of domestic job tasks can be described by a non-monotonic,
U-shaped task productivity schedule. This permits us to capture various phases of international competition
and to address their distributional effects for the domestic workforce. As we elaborate below, if offshoring ac-
tivities are limited to low-skilled job tasks – depicting globalization trends in the past (cf. Snower et al., 2009)
– then lower offshoring frictions generate a distributional effect similar to skill-biased technology changes.
If, on the other hand, offshoring is limited to high-skilled job tasks, then easier offshoring induces wage
impacts similar to unskill-biased technology changes.
Second, we capture three main channels characterizing the recent phase of globalization: i) accumula-
tion of advanced technologies abroad, i.e. a Ricardian effect, ii) accumulation of human capital abroad, i.e.
a Heckscher–Ohlin effect, and iii) decline in transport barriers, i.e. a trade cost effect. Although qualitatively
they generate similar effects, accounting explicitly for them permits us to address not only changes in the
nature of North–South trade, i.e. trade in goods and services between “rich” and “poor” countries, where
trade barriers are still substantial, but also the implications of market integration, such as in the context of
the enlargement of the European Union towards Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern European countries
since 2004, where trade costs are effectively null, but changes in comparative advantages are characterized
by a rapid accumulation of advanced technologies and human capital in these regions.
5See Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for an elaborate discussion on the limitation of the standard nested CES (so-called “canonical”)
model compared to the “task-assignment” approach. For the alternative task-skill-assignment approach, see also Autor and Dorn
(2013); Costinot and Vogel (2010); Dupuy (2012); Sly (2012).
6Notice the important difference to Ottaviano et al. (2013), who assess the task allocation between immigrant, offshore and native
workers, though each factor is homogeneous in terms of skills. Our framework, instead, could be easily extended to incorporate task
competition between immigrants and natives, e.g. by a CES decomposition of factor labor per task.
3Another new insight, gained from the general equilibrium analysis, is that the cost-efficiency effect in-
duced by easier offshoring depends now on the magnitude of the spillover effects. On the one hand, easier
offshoring induces a reallocation of tasks performed by medium-skilled workers to offshore workers. This
external reallocation is the main source of the productivity effect due to lower offshoring cost. There is, on
the other hand, a offshoring-induced spillover effect on other domestic skill groups, which we refer to as the
domestic reallocation of workers, i.e. from medium-skilled to low- and high-skilled job tasks. This internal
reallocation countervails the cost-efficiency effect induced by the external reallocation. Moreover, our anal-
ysis reveals that the difference between these two forces depends crucially on the elasticity of substitution
between skill groups at the respective extensive task margins.
The importance of this internal reallocation for the labor market impact of offshoring has been put for-
ward in several recent empirical studies (Baumgarten et al., 2013; Ebenstein et al., 2014; Hummels et al.,
2014). In a nutshell, the empirical evidence suggests that switching occupation is costly for offshoring-
induced displaced workers. Using matched worker-firm data from Denmark, Hummels et al. (2014) find
that offshoring increases the skill premium within firms, i.e. the relative wage of skilled workers, and that
the downward wage pressure is more pronounced in occupations that involve routine tasks. However, by
allowing for labor mobility across occupations, they find that the cohort-average wage loss (i.e. of workers
who leave the firm, and those who stay) is exacerbated for both low- and high-skilled workers. The authors
relate the latter outcome to losses in specific human capital and search cost that considerably hinder the
reattachment to the labor market for the offshoring-induced displaced workers. Ebenstein et al. (2014) in-
vestigate the impact of trade and offshoring on wages for the USA. The empirical findings show that import
penetration and offshoring induce a downward pressure for workers performing routine intensive occupa-
tions, while export activities have a positive impact. Moreover, the empirical evidence emphasizes that the
negative wage effect becomes substantial once occupation-sector mobility of workers is taken into account,
suggesting the important role of occupation-specific human capital. Using data for Germany, Baumgarten
et al. (2013) find a substantial negative cross-industry wage pattern due to offshoring in occupations with
a high routine task content relative to interactivity and non-routine content of occupational tasks, for both
low-skilled and high-skilled workers. Our framework contributes also to the empirical literature by providing
structural guidance on the occupational mobility of displaced workers. As we discuss below, the degree of
task substitutability between different skill groups is the critical parameter that accounts for the magnitude
of internal reallocation.
Another particular debate on offshoring is the displacement effect of the least skilled workers from the
labor market. We address this concern by assuming equilibrium unemployment of low-skilled workers in
the economy. To keep the framework tractable, we allow for two types of labor market friction. The first
source is given by a minimum wage scheme that is set above the market-clearing wage rate and thus leads
to unemployment. In a second step, we allow for endogenous supply of low-skilled labor services. While
the former – reflecting a perfectly elastic labor supply curve – corresponds to the mirror image of the full
employment case, the latter facilitates a more general notion of how the labor market adjusts to offshoring
shocks by allowing an elastic labor supply curve. In this second step we derive clear conditions under which
the offshoring-induced spillover effects translate into higher low-skilled employment. This is the second
contribution to the literature on offshoring tasks.7
7It is worth mentioning the study by Kohler and Wrona (2011), who introduce equilibrium unemployment following the search and
4The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the task assignment model. In
section 3, we describe the production technology and derive the solution to the firm’s optimization problem.
Section 4 provides the general equilibrium solution followed by the comparative statics in section 5. The
implications of offshoring and spillover effects on low-skill unemployment are discussed in section 6. Finally,
section 7 offers concluding remarks.
2 Task Assignment
In this section, we discuss the main properties of the task-based framework introduced by Acemoglu and
Autor (2011) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). As will be seen below, the factor labor loses its static
property and is now assigned to a continuum of tasks based on a Ricardian type of comparative advantage.
Consider an economy where different groups of workers perform a job task. The range of the existing
tasks is defined over a unit interval. More specifically, a task i can be performed in different modes: by
domestic low- (L), medium- (M ), and high-skilled (H) labor, as well as by foreign, offshored workers (O).
Formally, the production function for a task is written as
t(i) = ALaL(i)lL(i) +AMaM (i)lM (i) +AHaH(i)lH(i) +AOaO(i)lO(i)/τ, i ∈ [0, 1], (1)
where A denotes the factor-augmenting technology and a(i) indicates the job-task productivity schedule of
the respective labor type. The “iceberg” type offshoring friction is captured by the parameter τ ≥ 1. The
number of low-, medium-, high-skilled and offshore workers performing a job-task i is denoted by lk(i), k =
{L,M,H,O}.
Below we derive the optimal allocation between the three domestic skill groups as well as the offshore
workers. While the single good producer solves simultaneously the optimal assignment of tasks to differ-
ent labor groups, we demonstrate this procedure sequentially to make the optimal decision behavior better
understandable.
2.1 Allocation of Domestic Tasks
We assume that, over the unit interval, tasks are ordered according to the skill requirement in a monotonic
way. For example, one can think of this order as manual (e.g. restoring houses and servicing), routine (e.g.
bookkeeping and running a machine), and cognitive (e.g. research and management activities) tasks.
Assumption 1. (Domestic Task Productivity)
For all i ∈ [0, 1], aL(i)aM (i) and
aM (i)
aH(i)
are strict monotonically decreasing in i, and by transitivity property aL(i)aH(i)
is also strict monotonically decreasing in i.
Since the firm allocates tasks to the group that is the most cost-efficient in performing those tasks, this
assumption allows us to determine the equilibrium allocation of tasks among the domestic workers. Let the
unit cost of producing task i domestically be ck(i) = wkAkak(i) , k = {L,M,H}wherewk denotes the wage costs,
matching theory and the efficiency wage theory into the original task framework of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), characterized
by a single sector and homogeneous factor labor. However, our objective is neither to compare different paradigms of labor market
friction nor to discuss their different adjustment mechanisms. Thus we deliberately avoid any unnecessary complexity of the model.
5and cL(0) < cM (0) < cH(0). Denoting relative task-productivity by βL(i) =
aL(i)
aM (i)
and βH(i) =
aM (i)
aH(i)
, then, in
equilibrium, it follows
Lemma 1 (Domestic Task Allocation). By Assumption 1, there exist task margins IL, IH , and I˜, respectively,
where a representative domestic firm is indifferent between
• Low- and medium-skilled workers
wL
AL
(
βL(IL)
)−1
=
wM
AM
(2)
• Medium- and high-skilled workers
wH
AH
βH(IH) =
wM
AM
(3)
• Low- and high-skilled workers
wL
AL
(
βL(I˜)
)−1
= βH(I˜)
wH
AH
. (4)
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Thus, by Lemma 1, the domestic allocation of tasks to skill groups is characterized by the two endoge-
nous thresholds, IL and IH . Moreover, Eqs. (2) and (3) determine the degree of substitutability between the
domestic skill groups. Put differently, the reallocation of medium-skilled workers to low- and high-skilled
intensive job tasks depends on their comparative advantages in the neighborhood of IL and IH relative to
low-skilled and high-skilled workers, which is characterized by βL(i) and βH(i). More formally,
dIL
d ln(wM/wL)
=
1
εL
(2′)
dIH
d ln(wH/wM )
=
1
εH
, (3′)
where εL = −∂ ln βL(IL)∂IL > 0 and εH = −
∂ ln βH(IH)
∂IH
> 0 denote the semi-elasticities at the respective equi-
librium extensive margins. Thus, higher values of εL and εH denote a relative high comparative advantage
of medium-skilled workers at the respective task margin, which in turn implies a low substitutability. As
pointed our by Acemoglu and Autor (2011), this indicates an additional source of substitution effect, i.e. the
substitutability of skills across tasks.
A corollary follows from Lemma 1
Corollary 1. For all wLAL
(
βL(I˜)
)−1
= wHAH βH(I˜) >
wM
AM
> max{wLAL βL(0)−1, wHAH βH(1)}, it follows that 0 < IL <
I˜ < IH < 1.
This is a necessary and sufficient condition permitting the existence of all three skill groups in the econ-
omy. The lower boundary indicates that low-skilled workers are the most efficient ones at the least skill-
intensive task i = 0 and high-skilled workers are the most efficient ones at the most skill-intensive task i = 1.
In addition, the upper boundary ensures that medium-skilled workers have comparative advantages in the
middle range of the task distribution. For example, if wLAL βL(I˜)
−1 = wHAH βH(I˜) ≤ wMAM , then employment con-
sists of only low- and high-skilled workers.8 Medium-skilled workers have then no comparative advantage
8Notice that at strict equality the employer is indifferent between all three skill groups at margin I˜.
6in performing any task relative to low- and high-skilled workers. To sum up, by Lemma 1 and Corollary 1, the
domestic labor force is allocated over the unit interval as follows: low-skilled workers are employed in the
interval i ∈ [0, IL], medium-skilled in i ∈ (IL, IH), and high-skilled in i ∈ [IH , 1]. We depict the equilibrium
task allocation in Figure 1.
2.2 Allocation of Offshored Tasks
As discussed in the introduction, the empirical evidence shows that over recent decades there has been a
strong tendency to reallocate domestic tasks abroad. This process particularly applies to jobs intensive in
routine tasks and concentrated in the middle range of the skill distribution. This in turn may explain the
recent trends in wage polarization in many advanced countries. Based on this pattern, Acemoglu and Autor
(2011) investigate the distributional effect of offshoring by allowing a sub-range of domestic tasks, which
were previously performed by medium-skilled workers, to be exogenously offshored.
However, this ad-hoc introduction of offshoring neglects to address another important aspect discussed
in the literature: the offshoring-induced productivity effect. In order to address this effect, we need to ac-
count not only for changes at the extensive margin, as in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), but also for changes at
the intensive margin. The intuition is that easier offshoring, e.g. due to lower trade cost, will not only induce
more domestic job tasks to be offshored (extensive margin), but will additionally have implications for all job
tasks that have already been offshored (intensive margin). Therefore it may affect overall production costs.
We augment the general task-based framework of Acemoglu and Autor (2011) by allowing domestic firms
to choose endogenously the cost-optimal range of tasks to be offshored. As we discuss below, this in turn
requires a non-monotonic comparative advantage schedule between domestic medium-skilled and offshore
workers. More precisely, the relative task-productivity schedule becomes a U- (or V-)shaped relationship.
Moreover, as we discuss below, any scenario of offshoring can be described by this U-shaped functional
form. Formally, we impose the following assumption
Assumption 2. (Offshoring Task Productivity)
Defining the job-task productivity between medium-skilled and offshore workers by ζ(i) = aM (i)aO(i) , there
exists a threshold Iˇ such that for all i ∈ [0, Iˇ), ζ(i) is (strict) monotonically decreasing, and for all i ∈ (Iˇ , 1], ζ(i)
is (strict) monotonically increasing.
Let the offshoring wage rate be given by wO. Then, a domestic firm engaged in offshoring chooses the
optimal amount of offshore workers, given the wage rate wO, according to the following unit cost of pro-
ducing task i abroad: cO(i) = τ wOAOaO(i) . The term
τwO
AO
is exogenous to the domestic firm and comprises
the aforementioned three channels of globalization process, a feature that is missing in Acemoglu and Autor
(2011). For example, a decline in wO is associated with skill accumulation abroad, indicating the Heckscher–
Ohlin effect, an increase in AO denotes advances in foreign technology, the Ricardian effect, and a decline in
τ indicates lower transportation barriers, the trade cost effect. Summarizing all these exogenous channels by
ω ≡ AOτwO , lower offshoring friction is now captured by dω > 0. Although each channel generates a similar
qualitative effect, accounting explicitly for each of them has the following advantages. First, it allows us to
address the implication of various forms of globalization, e.g. North–South vs. East–West type of trade and
offshoring activities. Second, it enables us to provide clear policy guidance regarding how the source country
of offshoring could react to the increasing global competition on domestic jobs, e.g. if lower offshoring fric-
7tion is due to dwO < 0, then one possible response could be to increase the trading costs dτ > 0; if it is due to
dAO > 0, then the source economy could possibly invest more in R &D to increase its technology frontier on
those job tasks (i.e. dAM > 0). The optimal task allocation between foreign and domestic medium-skilled
workers is summarized as follows.
Lemma 2. By Assumption 2, there exist two task margins where a firm is indifferent between the domestic
medium-skilled and offshore workers, i.e.
ζ(I1)
ω
=
wM
AM
(5)
ζ(I2)
ω
=
wM
AM
. (6)
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Thus, by Lemma 2 the effect of offshoring is captured by the two endogenous offshoring boundaries, I1
and I2. They capture both the extensive margin, i.e. the offshorability of the marginal domestic task, as well
as the intensive margin, i.e. the amount of tasks that have been already offshored. However, it is useful and
sufficient to consider changes to the length of offshoring interval, i.e.
IO = I2 − I1,
which accounts implicitly for two conditions, (5) and (6). This has analytical convenience. Let the semi-
elasticities at the two offshoring margins be constant and defined as ε1 = −∂ ln ζ1(I1)∂I1 > 0 and ε2 =
∂ ln ζ2(I2)
∂I2
>
0. Then, by a simple positive monotone transformation, we obtain
Lemma 3. If Lemma 2 holds, then the two no-arbitrage conditions determining the task reallocation between
medium-skilled and offshore workers can be expressed as one monotonically increasing function in the length
of the offshorable task interval
wM
AM
=
βO(IO)
ω
, (7)
with βO(IO) = exp[µIO] and µ = ε2ε1ε2+ε1 > 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
From Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 it follows
Corollary 2. For all ω in the interval AMwM βO(0) < ω < {AMwM ζ(IL)), AMwM ζ(IH))}, and IL < I˘| ∂ ln ζ(·)∂i =0 < IH , it
follows that IO > 0 and IO ∈ (IL, IH).
Thus Corollary 2 ensures that offshoring activities are permitted, but limited to a sub-range of medium-
skilled job tasks. Put differently, if ω is sufficiently low such that ω = AMwM ζ(IL) (or ω =
AM
wM
ζ(IH)), then there
is direct competition between foreign and domestic low-skilled (or high-skilled) workers.9 Thus, for all four
types of workers to exist in the economy, we assume that both Corollaries 1 and 2 hold. These conditions, as
well as the equilibrium task allocations, are sketched in Figure 1.
9Notice that such an outcome – as pointed out by Blinder (2009a,b) – might not be unrealistic. However, the polarization effect would
become ambiguous due to the direct competition of offshore workers with low-skilled (or high-skilled) workers next to medium-skilled
workers.
8Figure 1: Equilibrium task allocation
1
i
wM
AM
wL
AL
βL(i)
−1
wH
AH
βH(i)
IL IH
τ wOAO ζ(i)
I2I1 Iˇ
I˜
0
Summarizing the results above, the task production function emerges as
t(i) =

ALaL(i)l(i) for all i ∈ [0, IL]
AMaM (i)m(i) for all i ∈ (IL, IH) \ IO
AOaO(i)o(i)/τ for all i ∈ IO
AHaH(i)h(i) for all i ∈ [IH , 1].
(8)
Equation (8), therefore, reveals the new feature of our model. First, the range of offshorable tasks is deter-
mined endogenously. Second, the reallocation of domestic medium-skilled tasks and the size of the expan-
sion of offshorable tasks is crucially determined by the relative productivity schedules in the neighborhood
of I1 and I2, i.e. by the parameters ε1 and ε2. Below, we elaborate analytically on these features.
3 Production Technology and Labor Demand
The economy produces a final (consumption) good under perfect competition. The output is generated by
using a labor composite, E, according to the following Cobb–Douglas technology function
Y = BE1−α, α ∈ (0, 1), (9)
whereB is a positive parameter that may contain exogenous variables such as total factor productivity (TFP)
and physical capital, and α denotes the standard share of physical capital. Thus the production function (9)
has diminishing returns in labor input.10 We consider Y as the numeraire, i.e. PY = 1. The labor composite
input is, in turn, described by differentiated tasks, over a unit interval, according to the following Cobb–
10Notice that whenB = 1 and α = 0, equation (9) reduces to the one used by Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
9Douglas technology:11
E = exp
(∫ 1
0
ln(t(i))di
)
. (10)
This specification allows us to deliver new insights regarding the offshoring-induced cost-efficiency effect.
3.1 Optimal Labor Demand
The firm’s optimization problem is as follows. Taking the output price as given, the representative firm max-
imizes its profit by choosing the optimal amount of the labor composite factor. Formally, this is given by
max
E
pi = Y − PEE, s.t. (9).
The solution yields the optimal total employment
E = P
− 1α
E B, (11)
where B = ((1−α)B)1/α and PE denotes the price index of the labor composite, which will be defined below.
The optimal amount of labor input per job task is determined by means of cost minimization. Formally, we
write the optimal programming of the firm as follows:
C∗E(wL, wM , wH , wO) ≡ min
lL(i),lM (i),lH(i),lO(i),E
[
wL
∫ IL
0
lL(i)di+ wM
∫
i∈SM
lM (i)di (12)
+wO
∫
i∈IO
lO(i)di+ wH
∫ 1
IH
lH(i)di
]
s.t. (8), (10),
where the corresponding set of domestic medium-skill-intensive job tasks is denoted by SM = (IH−IL−IO).
The corresponding minimized cost function of the labor composite is given by:
C∗E(·) = exp
[∫ IL
0
ln
(
wL
ALaL(i)
)
di+
∫
i∈SM
ln
(
wM
AMaM (i)
)
di+
∫
i∈IO
ln
(
τwO
AOaO(i)
)
di+
∫ 1
IH
ln
(
wH
AHaH(i)
)
di
]
E. (13)
Then, by Shepard’s lemma, we obtain the optimal labor demand per task:12
∂C∗E(·)
∂wL
=
(
wL
PE
)−1
E = lL (14a)
∂C∗E(·)
∂wM
=
(
wM
PE
)−1
E = lM (14b)
∂C∗E(·)
∂wH
=
(
wH
PE
)−1
E = lH (14c)
∂C∗E(·)
∂wO
=
(
wO
PE
)−1
E = lO, (14d)
11Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) assume perfect complementarity, i.e. a Leontief production function. Ottaviano et al. (2013)
assume a more general functional form by using a CES production technology.
12In Appendix D, we derive the minimized cost function C∗(·) and show that at the optimum the number of workers per task is
constant across the respective range of tasks. This is particularly due to the Cobb–Douglas assumption of the production technology as
well as the law of one price within each skill group. This implies that the marginal productivity within each skill-task group is constant,
i.e. l(i) = l,m(i) = m, and so on. See Firpo et al. (2011) for a critical discussion regarding the assumption of law of one price.
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where we used the fact that in perfect competitive equilibrium price equals marginal costs, i.e.
PE = exp
[∫ IL
0
ln
(
wL
ALaL(i)
)
di+
∫
i∈SM
ln
(
wM
AMaM (i)
)
di+
∫
i∈IO
ln
(
τwO
AOaO(i)
)
di+
∫ 1
IH
ln
(
wH
AHaH(i)
)
di
]
. (15)
The price index contains all three exogenous variables leading to changes in the offshoring friction: for-
eign technology (AO), foreign wages (wO), offshoring trade cost (τ ). Recall thatω = AOwOτ , then it can be shown
that the partial effect of easier offshoring (dω > 0) causes the marginal (average) cost of labor to decrease.
That is,
∂PE
∂ω
< 0. (15′)
The impact of lower offshoring friction refers to what is called the offshoring-induced cost-efficiency
improvement in the literature.13 However, the general equilibrium implications (i.e. taking into account
changes in the task margins) reveal a countervailing effect due to an internal (domestic) reallocation of
workers, which is generally ignored in the literature. To account for this, Eq. (15) needs further manipu-
lation. Utilize the cut-off conditions (2) and (3) from Lemma 1 to substitute for wLAL and
wH
AH
, respectively.
Analogously, utilize the no-arbitrage condition (7) from Lemma 3 to substitute for τwOAO . Then, PE reduces to
PE =
wM
AM
exp
[∫ IL
0
ln
(
βL(IL)
aL(i)
)
di−
∫
i∈SM
ln(aM (i))di+
∫
i∈IO
ln
(
1
βO(IO)aO(i)
)
di+
∫ 1
IH
ln
(
1
βH(IH)aH(i)
)
di
]
.
Decompose the term
∫
i∈SM ln(aM (i))di to combine it with the terms ln aL(i), ln aO(i), and ln aH(i). Then,
after some rearranging and manipulation, we obtain
PE =
wM
AM
Ω(IL, IH , IO), (16)
where14
Ω(·) = exp
[(∫ IL
0
ln
(
βL(IL)
βL(i)
)
di+
∫ 1
IH
ln
(
βH(i)
βH(IH)
)
di+
∫
i∈IO
ln
(
ζ(i)
βO(IO)
)
di−
∫ 1
0
ln(aM (i))di
)]
(17)
denotes the generalized common part of the marginal task cost. Thus this common part Ω accounts for the
general equilibrium effect due to changes in the offshorability of domestic tasks. Contrary to the original
version of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), where Ω is simply defined as a function of one offshoring
margin, easier offshoring does not necessarily induce a cost-efficiency effect. As we elaborate below, it de-
13It is worth mentioning that this effect is omitted in Acemoglu and Autor (2011) as the price index PE is set to unity.
14More precisely, after substitution, the term within the square brackets becomes[∫ IL
0
ln
(
βL(IL)
aL(i)
)
di+
∫ IL
0
ln(aM (i))di+
∫ 1
IH
ln(aM (i))di+
∫
i∈IO
ln(aM (i))d−
∫ 1
0
ln(aM (i))di
+
∫
i∈IO
ln
(
1
βO(IO)aO(i)
)
di+
∫ 1
IH
ln
(
1
βH(IH)aH(i)
)
di
]
.
As is readily seen, the expression can be reduced further. For example,∫ IL
0
ln(aM (i))di−
∫ IL
0
ln(aL(i))di =
∫ IL
0
ln(βL(i))di,
and so on. Following these steps, we obtain Eq. (17).
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pends on the interaction between internal reallocation, i.e. medium-skilled workers to low- and high-skilled
job tasks, and external reallocation, i.e. moving domestic jobs abroad.
4 General Equilibrium Solution
The general equilibrium closed solution to the equilibrium task margins is characterized by the cut-off con-
ditions (2), (3) and (7) derived respectively in Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, and the optimal labor demand func-
tions, (14a)–(14d). From these conditions, we obtain a system of three equations determining simultane-
ously the implicit solution to the task margins, as we elaborate in this section.
From the optimal task-skill allocation (8) we obtain the labor-market-clearing condition
∫ IL
0
lL(i)di = NL,
∫
i∈SM
lM (i)di = NM ,
∫ 1
IH
lH(i)di = NH ,
∫
i∈IO
lO(i)di = nO, (18)
where Nk, k ∈ {L,M,H} denotes the total (exogenously given) mass of domestic labor supply by skill and
nO indicates the total (endogenous) mass of offshore employment. The labor-market-clearing condition (18)
can be solved for lL, lM , lH and lO. Utilizing the resulting expressions, respectively, in the demand functions
(14a)–(14d) and solving for relative medium-skilled wages, we obtain
wL
wM
=
NM
NL
IL
IH − IL − IO
(19a)
wM
wO
=
nO
NM
IH − IL − IO
IO
(19b)
wM
wH
=
NH
NM
IH − IL − IO
1− IH
. (19c)
It is readily seen from Eqs. (19a), (19b) and (19c) that, ceteris paribus, the relative (inverse) demand functions
are decreasing in the labor supply and increasing in the respective equilibrium task margins. Note, however,
that Eq. (19b) contains on the right-hand side an additional endogenous variable, nO, which is defined by
the FOC (14d). Since the offshoring wage rate,wO, is exogenously given for the domestic firm, any changes in
the interval of offshorable tasks IO will affect nO. To adjust for this effect, substitute for nO from the optimal
demand equation (14d) and condition (18) to obtain
nO
IO
=
PEE
wO
. (14d′)
Furthermore, from (11) we get PEE = P
− 1−αα
E B. Substituting it back into (14d′) yields
nO
IO
=
P
− 1−αα
E B
wO
. (14d′′)
However, the price index is a function of task margins, thus endogenous too. To account for this, utilize the
cut-off conditions (7) from Lemma 3 for wMAM in (16), and rearrange to obtain
PE =
βO(IO)
ω
Ω(IL, IH , IO).
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Substituting this for PE in (14d′′), and combining the outcome with (19b), we obtain the relative demand
function
wM
wO
=
B(
βO(IO)
ω Ω(IL, IH , IO)
) 1−α
α
wO
IH − IL − IO
NM
. (20)
Combining now the Eqs. in (19a) and (19c) , respectively, with the no-arbitrage conditions (2) and (3) as
well as (20) with the no-arbitrage condition (7), after rearranging slightly, yields
NLAL
NMAM
=
IL
(IH − IL − IO)βL(IL) (21a)
B
NMAM
ω
1
α =
βO(IO)
1
αΩ(·) 1−αα
IH − IL − IO (21b)
NMAM
NHAH
=
IH − IL − IO
(1− IH)βH(IH) , (21c)
where again ω ≡ AOτwO captures exogenous changes in offshorability. We summarize the equilibrium charac-
teristics in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Unique Equilibrium). By Lemmata 1, 2, and 3, together with the Corollaries 1 and 2, the
system of equations (21a)–(21c) determines the unique equilibrium values for all endogenous task margins
{IL, IH , IO} as a function of the exogenous variables and parameters.
Proof. A rigorous formal discussion is provided in the supplementary mathematical Appendix F.
Notice that the left-hand side of the Eqs. in (21) consists only of exogenous variables and parameters of
the model. The right-hand sides denote the medium-skilled labor demand relative to other type of workers
at the equilibrium set of tasks. For example, in Eq. (21a) the right-hand side can be seen as the relative
demand for low-skill-intensive tasks, in (21c) the relative demand for high-skill-intensive tasks is denoted,
and so on. Therefore the 3×3 system of equations in (21) determines the general equilibrium closed solution
of the endogenous task margins.
5 Comparative Statics
Utilizing the system (21a)–(21c), we compute in this section the general equilibrium effects of easier off-
shoring on the endogenous equilibrium margins. Particularly, as mentioned earlier, easier offshoring is as-
sociated with dω > 0 induced either by i) a Heckscher–Ohlin effect, lower foreign wage costs (dwO < 0) due
to accumulation of human capital abroad; ii) a Ricardian effect, advances in technology (dAO > 0), e.g. ow-
ing to utilization of more advanced machines abroad; and/or iii) a trade cost effect, lower offshoring cost
(dτ < 0), e.g. because of abolition of transportation barriers.
Therefore, next to trade cost, we explicitly account for two additional channels of increasing globalization
of the production process. This feature is missing from both the original framework of Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008) and the generalized one of Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
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5.1 Increasing Offshorability and Task Reallocation
Taking logs in the equations derived in (21) and rearranging, we obtain
− ln
(
NLAL
NMAM
)
+ ln IL − ln (IH − IL − IO)− lnβL(IL) =0 (22a)
− ln
( B
AMNM
)
− ln (IH − IL − IO) + 1
α
lnβO(IO) +
1− α
α
ln Ω(·) = 1
α
lnω (22b)
− ln
(
NMAM
NHAH
)
+ ln (IH − IL − IO)− lnβH(IH)− ln(1− IH) = 0. (22c)
Now we can compute the impact of easier offshoring on the task margins. We summarize the main results
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Easier Offshoring of Medium-Skilled Tasks & Changes in Task Margins). Qualitatively, easier
offshoring (dω > 0), due to advances in offshoring-biased technology (dAO > 0), or lower offshoring cost
(dτ < 0), or a decline in foreign wage costs (dwO < 0), induces an expansion of the offshorable task range and
a contraction of low- and high-skill-intensive tasks ranges
dIL
dω
< 0,
dIO
dω
> 0,
dIH
dω
> 0, and
∣∣∣∣dIOdω
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣dIHdω
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣dILdω
∣∣∣∣ .
The asymmetry in the domestic reallocation of medium-skilled workers is determined by the comparative ad-
vantage schedules ∣∣∣∣d ln ILdω
∣∣∣∣ Q ∣∣∣∣d ln IHdω
∣∣∣∣ , ⇒ ∣∣∣∣1 + εH(1−H)1− IH
∣∣∣∣ Q ∣∣∣∣1 + εLILIL
∣∣∣∣ .
Proof. A full analytical proof is provided in Appendix E.1.
The intuition can be explained in the following way. Easer offshoring increases the cost advantage for
domestic firms to reallocate domestic job tasks abroad. This effect displaces the marginal medium-skilled
workers performing job tasks in the neighborhood of IO. The Walrasian nature of the labor market implies
a downward wage adjustment of medium skilled workers. This in turn indicates that the no-arbitrage con-
ditions in Lemma 1 are off equilibrium, which are reassured by a reallocation of displaced medium-skilled
workers to low-skill- (i.e. lower IL) and high-skill- (i.e. higher IH) intensive job tasks.
Thus, Proposition 2 highlights what Costinot and Vogel (2010) call a task upgrading at the high-skill-
extensive margin, i.e. more medium-skilled workers produce former high-skilled tasks, and a task down-
grading at the low-skill-extensive margin, i.e. more medium-skilled workers produce former low-skilled
tasks.15 Again, the magnitude of the skill down- and upgrading is determined by substitutability of medium-
skilled workers at the equilibrium task margins IL and IH . Thus a relative low substitutability at the high-
skill-intensive job tasks (higher values of εH) implies that medium-skilled workers are disproportionately
allocated into low-skill-intensive job tasks. The empirical literature has highlighted a gradual increase in
skill downgrading in many advanced countries. Particularly, medium-skilled workers are more likely to be
15Notice, however, that (easier) offshoring in our framework differs from Costinot and Vogel (2010, section VI.B.). Their results affirm
a pervasive rise in wages of more skilled workers, i.e. an increase in inequality, induced by an implicit increase in the size of the relatively
skill scarce foreign economy. In contrast, we follow up on the recent empirical findings on the offshoring-induced polarization effect,
i.e. a decline in wages of medium-skilled workers relative to low- and high-skilled, and highlight different channels that may lead to
easier offshoring.
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downgraded into jobs (occupations) that require lower educational attainment (Brynin and Longhi, 2009).
In the following section we deviate from the perfect competitive labor market assumption and investigate
the potential crowding-out effect of low-skilled workers induced by offshoring.
5.2 Offshoring and Distributional Effects
As discussed in the introduction, in many advanced countries the recent evidence highlights a polarizing
wage trend, i.e. a relative decline of medium-skilled wages compared to low- and high-skilled wages. This is
in sharp contrast to wage developments in the past, where the burden of globalization regarding wage and
employment cuts was mainly borne by low-skilled workers. Particularly, the evolution of earnings inequality
followed a monotonic increase between the skill groups (for a neat survey of the literature, see Acemoglu and
Autor, 2011). In this section, we address the distributional effect of different stages of global competition and
show that offshoring generates income effects similar to factor-biased technology (cf. Acemoglu, 2002). We
summarize the main results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Offshoring and Income Distribution). If offshoring activities are limited to low-skilled-intensive
job tasks (indicating globalization trends in the past), then lower offshoring friction induces a distributional
impact similar to skill-biased technology change, i.e.
d
(
wL/wM
)
dω < 0 and
d
(
wM/wH
)
dω < 0. If offshoring is
permitted to medium-skilled job tasks (indicating recent globalization trends), then easier offshoring leads
to a wage polarization effect, i.e.
d
(
wL/wM
)
dω > 0 and
d
(
wM/wH
)
dω < 0. If offshoring activities are limited to
high-skill-intensive job tasks (indicating potential future globalization trends), then a marginal decline in
offshoring friction lowers the wage gap between skill groups similar to unskilled-biased technology changes,
i.e
d
(
wL/wM
)
dω > 0 and
d
(
wM/wH
)
dω > 0.
Below we provide a graphical assessment of the distributional impact of each of the offshoring scenarios.
Polarization Effect
Given the results of the comparative statics for changes in the equilibrium task margins, we proceed now with
the assessment of the distributional effect of offshoring of medium-skilled job tasks. In doing so, we need to
recall the no-arbitrage conditions: Eq. (2): wLwM =
AL
AM
βL(IL) , and Eq. (3): wMwH =
AM
AH
βH(IH); together with
the labor demand functions for medium-skilled workers relative to low-skilled workers Eq. (19a): DLM ≡
wL
wM
= NMNL
IL
I˙−IL , and relative to high-skilled workers, Eq. (19c): DMH ≡
wM
wH
= NHNM
IH−Iˆ
1−IH , where I˙ ≡ IH − IO
and Iˆ ≡ IL + IO. Thus, for given IH and IO, DLM is increasing in IL, while higher (lower) values of IO (IL)
induce a leftward shift ofDLM . The relative labor demand curve between medium- and high-skilled workers
DMH is increasing in IH for given values IL and IO, while higher values of both IO and IH lead to a rightward
shift of DMH .
Moreover, it is readily seen that, for all exogenous shocks, but labor-biased technology (Aj), changes in
the relative medium-skilled wage compared to low- and high-skilled wages is a movement along the task
productivity schedule, βL(·) and βH(·). To fix ideas, we illustrate the four conditions in Figure 2. Notice that
the marginal decline in offshoring friction is captured by a decline in I˙ and an increase in Iˆ, implying a shift
in the relative labor demand curves. From Proposition 2, the task margin IL will decline, while IH increases.
This will lead to a slight backward shift in the relative labor demand curves. Eventually, the economy will
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Figure 2: Offshoring medium-skilled job tasks and wage polarization
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b b′a′
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reach the points a′ and b′, denoting the new equilibrium task margins. Notice that the internal realloca-
tion of workers mitigates the wage polarization effect. The magnitude of this countervailing effect will have
important implications for changes in the level of wages, which we elaborate next.
Skill-Biased Effect
We now turn to the case where offshoring is permitted to low-skill-intensive job tasks. A formal discussion
of this scenario is provided in Appendix B. Notice again that any changes in relative wages between the skill
groups due to exogenous changes in offshoring friction is a movement along the relative task productivity
schedules, βL(IL) and βH(IH). The only difference compared to the previous case is that the relative labor
demand conditions have changed. Now a (sub)range of low-skill-intensive job tasks is offshored, denoted
by the equilibrium task margin I˜O. Thus any changes in offshoring friction will directly shift the relative de-
mand curve between low- and medium-skilled workers (denoted by D˜LM ) to the left, while the relative labor
demand between medium- and high-skilled workers (denoted by D˜MH) shifts rightward only for changes
in the task margin IL. We derive the relevant conditions in Appendix B and Figure 3 provides a graphical
illustration of them.
The intuitive mechanism behind the distributional effect of offshorability of low-skilled job tasks can
be explained in the following way. Compared to medium-skilled workers, a decline in the offshoring friction
(dω > 0) increases the comparative advantages of offshore workers relative to low-skilled workers. Thus more
low-skilled job tasks will be reallocated abroad that were previously performed by low-skilled workers. This
implies higher values of the task margin I˜O. Due to the Walrasian nature of the labor markets, the currently
offshoring-induced unemployed low-skilled workers must be reemployed, leading to higher competition for
available jobs and consequently to a decline of the low-skilled wage rate. This, in turn, raises the comparative
advantages of low-skilled workers relative to medium-skilled workers.
Consequently, a proportion of medium-skill-intensive job tasks will be now allocated to low-skilled work-
ers that were previously performed by medium-skilled workers (i.e. an increase in IL). This effect is captured
by a downward shift of the relative demand curve between low- and medium-skilled workers (D˜LM ). Follow-
16
Figure 3: Offshoring low-skilled job tasks and skill-biased wage effect
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ing similar logic, the relative demand curve between medium- and high-skilled workers will shift to the right.
These adjustments are depicted in Figure 3, where the economy converges eventually to the new equilibrium
points a′ and b′. As is readily seen, the skill premium, i.e. the relative wage between low- and medium-skilled
as well as between medium- and high-skilled workers, increases monotonically. This outcome confirms the
wage trends in the past due to international competition that were mainly borne by domestic unskilled work-
ers and is in sharp contrast to recent polarizing wage trends in many advanced countries. Thus recent trends
highlight the significant shift in the international competition for the domestic workforce.
Unskilled-biased Effect
As discussed in the introduction, many occupations that require a high level of skill for cognitive and com-
plex tasks (think of computer programming, statistical analysis) may be at peril in future due to potential
international competition (?Bhagwati et al., 2004). We provide a intuitive discussion of the distributional
impact of this possible future scenario and illustrate graphically the adjustment mechanism.
In this scenario offshoring occurs at the higher end of skill-task distribution, such that a proportion of
domestic high-skill-intensive job tasks is only allocated abroad, denoted by IˆO. As in the previous case, the
two no-arbitrage conditions (2) and (3) derived in Lemma 1 still hold. Thus the adjustment due to marginal
changes in the offshoring friction occurs along the relative labor demand functions, which is depicted now
by DˆLM and DˆMH . Intuitively, the mechanism works similarly to the previous cases. A lower offshoring
friction leads to an expansion of offshore job tasks. The now displaced high-skilled workers are induced to
compete for a lower range of job tasks available in the labor market, leading to a decline in their wages.
From the no-arbitrage condition (3) it follows that IH declines. This is illustrated in Figure 4 by a rightward
shift in the relative labor demand curve between high- and medium-skilled workers DˆMH . Consequently
the competition between medium-skilled workers increases, which pushes their wages down. From no-
arbitrage condition (2) it can be verified that IL declines. This is depicted by a leftward shift of the relative
demand curve DˆMH in Figure 4. The labor market converges eventually to the new equilibrium points a′ and
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Figure 4: Offshoring high-skilled job-tasks and unskill-biased wage effects
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b′, which indicates an increase of relative wages of workers with an inferior skill level. In the next section,
we turn back to the polarization case and derive the condition under which the real wage of all domestic
workers increases due to the cost-efficiency effect.
5.3 Offshoring-induced Cost-efficiency Effect
As argued earlier, offshoring may generate a cost-efficiency effect similar to advances of technology. The
rationale for this is that domestic firms engaged in offshoring benefit from easier offshoring at the extensive
margin: more tasks can be moved abroad, as well as at the intensive margin: tasks that have already been
offshored now become cheaper to import – a feature that is omitted in Acemoglu and Autor (2011). Therefore
domestic firms experience a reduction in their average production cost, which in turn may lead to beneficial
outcomes for the domestic workers.
As will become evident below, the offshoring-induced cost effects depend now on the interaction be-
tween the external reallocation and the internal, domestic reallocation of tasks. These two forces will affect
the cost of composite labor PE , which in turn might benefit all workers, even those who have been displaced
directly. This new channel is in contrast to the task-based approaches discussed by Grossman and Rossi-
Hansberg (2008), where every type of domestic worker is performing a distinct range of tasks and offshoring
is characterized by one extensive margin, splitting task produced at home and abroad along this range. It
also differs from the approach by Acemoglu and Autor (2011), where the cost index of composite labor (PE)
is held constant.
To derive the effects of easier offshoring on the domestic real wage, we combine the domestic labor de-
mand functions, (14a), (14b) and (14c), with the labor-market-clearing condition (18) to obtain the inverse
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labor demand functions
wL =
IL
NL
PEE (23)
wM =
IH − IL − IO
NM
PEE (24)
wH =
1− IH
NH
PEE. (25)
Interestingly, the inverse labor demand conditions, (23), (24) and (25), imply that the cost share of each
skill group is now denoted by the endogenous equilibrium range of tasks performed by the respective skill
group. Moreover, the endogenous cost shares indicate the additional source of substitutability between skill
groups across the tasks. Thus this new property can be seen as a generalization of the standard Cobb–
Douglas function.16
Next, utilizing the optimal demand condition for E, Eq. (11), yields
wL =
IL
NL
P
− 1−αα
E B
wM =
IH − IL − IO
NM
P
− 1−αα
E B
wH =
1− IH
NH
P
− 1−αα
E B.
Recall now the definition of PE from Eq. (16) and, together with the no-arbitrage conditions (2) and (3)
defined in Lemma 1, we obtain, after some rearranging
wL =
(
IL
NL
)α (
βL(IL)
−1Ω(·))−(1−α)A1−αL Bα (26)
wM =
(
IH−IL−IO
NM
)α
(Ω(·))−(1−α)A1−αM Bα (27)
wH =
(
1−IH
NH
)α
(βH(IH)Ω(·))−(1−α)A1−αH Bα. (28)
These equations denote the generalized optimal demand for the domestic workforce that accounts for all
endogenous equilibrium task margins. It is immediately evident that, given the properties of the task pro-
ductivity schedules, βL(·) and βH(·), a decline in Ω(·) will induce a positive demand effect for labor in the
economy, thus increasing the wage level of all skills. We denote this effect as the cost-efficiency effect. Com-
puting changes in Ω(·), we obtain (see Appendix A for the formal derivation)
d ln Ω(·)
dω
=
(
(1− IH)εH dIH
dω
− εLIL dIL
dω
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
R>0
−
(
IOµ
dIO
dω
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
E>0
. (29)
Changes due to internal reallocation, i.e. relocating medium-skilled workers towards low- and high-skill-
intensive jobs is denoted byR and changes due to the external reallocation, i.e. moving domestic medium-
skill-intensive tasks abroad, is denoted by E . Notice that by the results of the comparative statics in Proposi-
tion 2, both the internalR and the external E allocation effects are positive.
16However, notice the difference compared to Acemoglu and Autor (2011), where the task margins denote the expenditure share of
each type of tasks in terms of the value of total output.
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Therefore, for the marginal production cost of composite labor (Ω) to decrease in the course of easier
offshoring, the necessary condition requires E > R. As shown in Appendix A, for the following sufficient
low substitutability between medium-skilled and offshore workers, the external reallocation effect will be
dominating, i.e.
µ >
1− (IH − IL)
IO(IH − IL − IO) . (30)
However, this condition is not sufficient to ensure an increase in the real wage. The sufficient condition
can be derived by straightforwardly differentiating the demand functions, (26), (27) and (28), which yields
d lnwL
dω
=
(
α
IL
− (1− α)εL
)
dIL
dω
− (1− α)d ln Ω
dω
(31a)
d lnwM
dω
= − αdIL
IH − IL − IO −
αdIO
IH − IL − IO +
αdIH
IH − IL − IO − (1− α)
d ln Ω
dω
(31b)
d lnwH
dω
=
(
(1− α)εH − α
1− IH
)
dIH
dω
− (1− α)d ln Ω
dω
. (31c)
Now using Eq.(29) to substitute for d ln Ωdω in (31b) and rearranging the terms, we obtain
d lnwL
dω
=
(
α
IL
− (1− α)εL
)
dIL
dω
− (1− α)d ln Ω
dω
(31a′)
d lnwM
dω
=
(
(1− α)ILεL − α
IH − IL − IO
)
dIL
dω
+
(
(1− α)IOµ− α
IH − IL − IO
)
dIO
dω
(31b′)
+
(
α
IH − IL − IO − (1− α)(1− IH)εH
)
dIH
dω
d lnwH
dω
=
(
(1− α)εH − α
1− IH
)
dIH
dω
− (1− α)d ln Ω
dω
(31c′)
Notice that defining the sign of Eq. (31b′) determines also the relationship between internal (i.e. E) and
external (i.e. R) task reallocation. The converse is obviously not true. Therefore, in (31a′) and (31c′) we
need to elaborate the sign of the first term on the right hand side. We summarize the results in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 (Offshoring-induced Cost-efficiency Effect). Given the impact of easier offshoring of medium-
skilled tasks on the task reallocation derived in Proposition 2, an offshoring-induced cost-efficiency improve-
ment raises the real wage of all domestic worker for the following jointly sufficient conditions:
1. α1−α
1
IL(IH−IL−IO) > εL >
α
(1−α)IL
2. α1−α
1
(1−IH)(IH−IL−IO) > εH >
α
1−α
1
(1−IH)
3. µ > α1−α
1
IO(IH−IL−IO) .
Proof. The lower boundary in part 3, as well as the upper limits in parts 1 and 2, follow straightforwardly
from (31b′). The lower limits in parts 1 and 2 are, respectively, derived from (31a′) and (31c′). 
The intuition behind the jointly sufficient conditions in Proposition 4 is the following. Higher values of εL
(εH) imply a higher comparative advantage of low-skilled (high-skilled) workers in the neighborhood of IL
(IH) relative to medium-skilled workers. Now recall Eq. (2′) and Eq. (3′) to see the implications. It is readily
evident that the size of the parameters εL and εH importantly determines the magnitude of the change of
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the task margins IL and IH for a one percentage change in relative wages, respectively. This effect is, as put
forward in Acemoglu and Autor (2011), the additional source of substitutability between skill groups across
tasks, next to the elasticity of substitution of unity arising from the Cobb–Douglas functional form.
The important implication of this additional substitution effect of skills across tasks can be inferred from
the following special case. Take the limit εL → 0 (indicating perfect substitutability between low- and
medium-skilled workers at IL), then from Eq. (31a′) it can be easily inferred that the first term reduces to
α
IL
dIL
dω , which by Proposition 2 is unambiguously negative. This is the offshoring-induced labor supply effect
as the displaced workers have to be reabsorbed by the labor market. Hence, Proposition 4 highlights that the
cost-efficiency effect due to easier offshoring will raise the real wage of all skill groups as the overall labor
demand increases more than offshoring-induced increase in labor supply if the comparative advantages of
low-skilled and high-skilled workers are sufficiently preserved.
6 Equilibrium Unemployment
So far we have assumed full employment and analyzed the pure distributional effect of offshoring. However,
another concern raised in the public debate on offshoring is the displacement effect of workers, leading to
unemployment. In this section, we generalize the framework by allowing for equilibrium unemployment.
In doing so, we assume that only low-skilled workers face the risk of unemployment. Intuitively and in line
with our discussion in the introduction, easier offshoring may indirectly displace low-skilled workers from
the labor market due to increasing competition with the offshoring-induced unemployed medium-skilled
workers. In the literature, this potential displacement effect is referred to as the crowding-out effect; see
Muysken et al. (2015) for a discussion.
We assume two alternative types of labor market friction, without altering the structure of the model. An
intuitive source of friction is a minimum wage regime, which is set above the market equilibrium wage rate.
Consequently, a proportion of low-skilled workers ends up unemployed. Alternatively, frictions can arise
when we allow for endogenous supply of low-skill labor services. In this case the low-skilled wage is set as a
mark-up over the unemployment benefits, where the mark-up depends negatively on unemployment rate.
While the former is the mirror image of the full-employment case, characterized by a perfect elastic labor
supply curve, the latter allows for an elastic labor supply curve and thus includes the standard approach of
labor supply.
6.1 Minimum Wage Regime
Let the institutional minimum wage be W¯ . We assume that the minimum wage is set sufficiently low such
that it is still attractive for domestic firms to employ low-skilled workers, but is sufficiently high such that a
proportion of low-skilled workers ends up unemployed. Let uL denote the low-skilled unemployment rate.
Formally, we impose the following assumption on the minimum wage scheme.
Assumption 3. (Minimum wage setting)
wL < W¯ <
wMAL
AM
βL(0),
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where wL and wM are the equilibrium values resulting from the model analyzed in the previous section.
Given the level of minimum wage, the representative firm will then reallocate the job tasks between low-
and medium-skilled workers such that the no-arbitrage condition (2) holds again, though at a lower equi-
librium threshold. Moreover, from the general equilibrium perspective, our analysis implies that all other
task margins will readjust too. The intuition is the following. A higher minimum wage scheme increases
the relative comparative advantage of medium-skilled workers compared to low-skilled workers. Thus, from
condition (2), the task margin IL must decline. This in turn implies that the range of tasks allocated to
medium-skilled workers will increase, and from relative medium-skill labor demand conditions (19a)–(19c),
medium skill wages will increase too. Consequently, the range of tasks performed by high-skilled (1 − IH)
and offshore workers IO must increase to satisfy again the no-arbitrage conditions (3) and (7).
In addition, compared to the full-employment case, now only a fraction of low-skilled workers can be
hired, i.e. nL = (1 − uL)NL, and the resource constraint becomes l = nLIL . This implies that the adjustment
channel in the low-skill labor market is through employment instead of wages. Thus the relative demand
condition for low-skilled workers defined in (19a) has to account for the endogenous adjustment in low-
skilled employment. In order to investigate the impact of offshoring on the low-skilled unemployment rate,
it is necessary to examine first the impact of offshoring on task allocation under the minimum wage scheme.
We proceed with the derivation of the new equilibrium conditions, while, for the sake of illustration, we use
the same expression for the equilibrium task margins as in the frictionless labor market scenario.
Recall the first-order condition (14a), where now the marginal productivity of low-skilled workers equals
the minimum wage scheme, and utilize the low-skilled labor constraint to obtain
nL
IL
=
P
− 1−αα
E B
W¯
, (32)
which is equivalent to the full-employment case, except that now the level of employment, nL, is endogenous
while the level of wage is fixed. Next, notice that the no-arbitrage condition (2) is defined now as
W¯
wM
=
AL
AM
βL(IL). (33)
Using this observation together with Eq. (16), we obtain
PE =
W¯
AL
βL(IL)
−1Ω(·). (34)
Substituting Eq. (34) for PE in Eq. (32), we obtain the generalized low-skilled labor demand equation
under a minimum wage scheme
nL
IL
=
(
W¯
AL
βL(IL)
−1Ω(·)
)− 1−αα B
W¯
. (35)
Utilizing this expression in the relative demand equation (19a), together with the new no-arbitrage condi-
tion (33), we obtain the modified implicit condition that accounts for the minimum wage scheme and the
22
endogenous low-skilled employment
B
AMNM
(
AL
W¯
)1/α
=
βL(IL)
−1/αΩ(·) 1−αα
IH − IL − IO . (36)
This is equivalent to Eq. (21a) in the frictionless labor market scenario. Utilizing Eq. (36) together with Eqs.
(21b) and (21c), we obtain the modified implicit 3× 3 system of equations for the endogenous task margins.
Taking logs and rearranging slightly yields
− 1
α
ln (βL(IL)) +
1− α
α
ln (Ω(IH , IL, IO))− ln (IH − IL − IO)− ln
( B
AMNM
)
− 1
α
ln
(
AL
W¯
)
= 0
1
α
ln (βO(IO)) +
1− α
α
ln (Ω(IH , IL, IO))− ln (IH − IL − IO)− ln
( B
AMNM
)
− 1
α
ln (ω) = 0 (37)
ln (IH − IL − IO)− ln (1− IH)− ln (βH(IH))− ln
(
AMNM
AHNH
)
= 0.
By straightforward differentiation of the system (37), one can compute the impact of an increase in the min-
imum wage scheme as well as easier offshoring on the equilibrium task margins. We summarize the main
results in the following proposition and refer readers to the Appendix E.2 and E.3 for a formal proof.
Proposition 5 (Minimum Wage, Offshoring Medium-skilled Tasks, and Task Margins). If offshoring medium-
skilled tasks is permitted and the low-skill labor market is characterized by a minimum wage scheme, then a
rise in the minimum wage scheme will lead to a contraction of low-skill-intensive jobs tasks, i.e. dIL
dW¯
< 0, and
an expansion of high-skill-intensive and offshorable job tasks, i.e. dIH
dW¯
< 0 and dIO
dW¯
> 0, respectively. Easier
offshoring generates similar skill-task reallocation as in Proposition 2.
Given these results, we can now assess the impact of easier offshoring in the low-skilled unemployment
rate. In doing so, recall the low-skilled labor demand condition (35). Rearranging and taking logs, we obtain
lnnL = ln(IL) +
1− α
α
ln(βL(IL))− 1− α
α
ln(Ω(·))− 1
α
ln W¯ +
1− α
α
lnAL + lnB.
Now total differentiating w.r.t. offshoring friction (dω > 0) yields
d lnnL
dω
=
(
1
IL
− (1− α)
α
εL
)
dIL
dω
− (1− α)
α
d ln Ω
dω
.
The following proposition summarizes the main results regarding the impact of offshoring on low-skilled
unemployment rate.
Proposition 6 (Minimum Wage, Offshoring Medium-Skilled Tasks, and Low-Skilled Unemployment). If a
fraction of low-skilled workers is unemployed due to a minimum wage scheme, then easier offshoring of
medium-skilled tasks will lead to a decline in the low-skilled unemployment rate if and only if Proposition
4 holds.
The intuition is similar to the one discussed in Proposition 4. The difference is that now, with a minimum
wage scheme, the low-skill labor market adjustment occurs via employment.
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6.2 Endogenous Labor Supply
A more general approach to addressing labor market frictions is to allow workers to supply endogenously
labor services, implying an elastic labor supply curve. This feature has important implications for labor
market outcomes. In doing so, we follow the standard approach in the literature and assume that the low-
skilled wage is a mark-up on unemployment benefits that depends negatively on the unemployment rate.
This mark-up can be explained in many ways, such as the standard individual leisure–work choice, wage
bargaining (Layard et al., 2005), search and matching theory à la Pissarides (2000) and efficiency wages à la
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). Imposing such a negative relationship between the mark-up and unemployment
induces an elastic labor supply curve. This way, we provide a more general analysis of labor market effects
of offshoring compared to the minimum wage case.17
Let the endogenous low-skilled wage curve be defined by
wL = f(uL)bL, (38)
where f(uL) denotes the mark-up over unemployment benefits, bL, and has the following properties: f(uL) >
1 and ∂f(uL)∂uL < 0. Moreover, we define the elasticity of the wage curve in absolute value w.r.t. uL as δ˜ ≡
−d ln f(uL)d lnuL > 0.
In this case, both the low-skilled wage and employment will adjust to exogenous shocks. Thus, compared
to full employment and minimum wage cases, the low-skilled labor demand functions (26) and (35) become
wL =
(
IL
(1− uL)NL
)α(
βL(IL)
Ω(·)
)1−α
(ALB)α , (39)
where we utilized nL = (1−uL)NL. This implies that the relative demand between low- and medium-skilled
workers in Eq. (21a) has to account for the endogenous changes in low-skilled employment. Formally, we
write this condition by
NLAL
NMAM
=
1
1− uL
IL
(IH − IL − IO)βL(IL) . (40)
The model is closed by the adjusted market-clearing condition in the low-skilled labor market, i.e. from
Eqs. (39) and (38)
f(uL)bL =
(
IL
(1− uL)NL
)α(
βL(IL)
Ω(·)
)1−α
A1−αL Bα. (41)
Thus the new system of equations consists of Eqs. (21b), (21c), (40) and (41). Taking logs and rearranging
17It is worth mentioning the important implications of applying different equilibrium unemployment paradigms regarding the adjust-
ment mechanism of the labor market to exogenous shocks. However, our objective is not to explain the efficiency of various adjustment
mechanisms, and thus we deliberately leave this to future research. For an application of search-matching and efficiency wage theories
to the original task-based approach of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), see Kohler and Wrona (2011).
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slightly, we obtain
ln
(
ALNL
AMNM
)
= − ln(1− uL) + ln IL − ln(IH − IL − IO)− lnβL(IL)
ln
( B
AMNM
)
+
1
α
lnω =
1
α
lnβO(IO) +
1− α
α
ln Ω(·)− ln(IH − IL − IO)
(42)
ln
(
AMNM
AHNH
)
= − ln(1− IH) + ln(IH − IL − IO)− lnβH(IH)
α ln
( B
NL
)
− ln bL + (1− α) lnAL = α ln(1− uL) + ln f(uL) + (1− α) (ln Ω(·)− lnβL(IL))− α ln IL.
This is the generalized 4 × 4 implicit system of equations that accounts for endogenous supply of labor
services. Notice also that the left-hand side consists of all exogenous variables, while the right-hand side
accounts for the four endogenous variables IL, IO, IH and uL.
Now the marginal impact of offshoring on task margins and the low-skilled unemployment rate can be
computed by straightforward differentiation of (42) w.r.t. ω and the endogenous variables. We summarize
the main results in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 (Offshoring Medium-skilled Tasks, Labor Supply, and Low-skilled Unemployment). If the low-
skilled labor market is characterized by an endogenous wage curve, where a fraction uL of low-skilled workers
are unemployed, then offshoring of medium-skill job tasks unambiguously reduces the low-skilled unemploy-
ment rate for sufficiently low substitutability between medium- and high-skilled workers at task margin IH
and between medium- and low-skilled workers at task margin IL, i.e.
εH >
α
(1− α)IH(1− IH) , εL >
1
(1− α)IL(IH − IL) .
Moreover, by the sufficient conditions in Proposition 4, real wages of all skill groups rise.
Proof. See Appendix E.4.
Thus Proposition 7 highlights again the importance of comparative advantages in performing job tasks,
which determine the magnitude of spillover effects induced by offshoring. Recall the interpretation of the
parameters εL and εH , capturing the substitutability of skill groups at the respective equilibrium task mar-
gin. The spillover of medium-skilled workers induced by offshoring is dominated by an overall rise in total
employment if both high-skilled and low-skilled workers have sufficiently high comparative advantages in
performing tasks in the neighborhood of IH and IL, respectively. Moreover, notice that the lower boundaries
in Proposition 7 dominate those in Proposition 4, but they are not binding since all derived boundaries are
not necessary conditions.18 The intuition behind the real wage effect is equivalent to the one provided in
Proposition 4.
In addition, it is important to notice the difference from the minimum wage case, where now higher
comparative advantages of low- and high-skilled workers are required due to endogenous labor supply. In-
tuitively, the low-skilled labor market will adjust to the spillover effect as follows. The bumping down of
18As discussed in the supplementary mathematical Appendix E.4, it can be verified that for sufficiently low substitutability between
medium-skilled and offshore workers (i.e. high values of µ), the low-skilled unemployment rate might still decline, even if Proposition
7 is violated.
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medium-skilled workers (lower IL) will displace some of low-skilled workers, who were previously perform-
ing those tasks in the neighborhood of IL. The increase in the unemployment rate will in turn lead to a
downward wage adjustment due to a lower mark-up (captured by a flatter wage curve), mitigating the rela-
tive rise in comparative advantage of medium-skilled workers.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the general equilibrium effects of easier offshoring on task allocation within
the domestic economy as well as in the foreign economy. We augment the current literature analyzing the
implications of increasing international competition vis-à-vis the domestic labor force with respect to the
following features. First, by introducing endogenous offshoring, we have augmented the framework of Ace-
moglu and Autor (2011), where offshoring is exogenously given. Second, we allow for a heterogeneous labor
market, characterized by low-, medium- and high-skilled workers, where the allocation of each skill group
to job tasks is based on a Ricardian type of comparative advantages along a unit interval. In doing so, we
augment the seminal task-based approach of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), where each group of
labor is producing a distinct, completely independent range of tasks. In this way, we are able to address two
contradictory hypotheses regarding the distributional impact of offshoring for domestic workers: a wage po-
larization effect and a cost-efficiency effect. Finally, we allow for equilibrium unemployment of low-skilled
workers. In doing so, we are able to capture important externalities in the labor market, such as the bumping
down of medium-skilled workers inducing a crowding-out effect of low-skilled workers.
The general equilibrium analysis provides several new insights, on which the existing theoretical liter-
ature has been silent. First, we show that any scenario of offshoring domestic job tasks can be described
by a U-shaped relative productivity schedule between domestic and offshore workers. This allows us to ad-
dress different stages of globalization, where the burden in terms of wage and employment cuts was borne
by different skill groups, e.g. the trends in the past affected mainly low-skilled workers, while recent trends
show increasing competition for medium-skilled workers, and potential future developments towards high-
skilled workers. Moreover, our analysis reveals that offshoring of low-skill-intensive job tasks generates dis-
tributional effects similar to skill-biased technology changes – consistent with observations in the past, see
Acemoglu (2002), offshoring medium-skill-intensive domestic job tasks induces a wage polarization effect
(reflecting recent trends), while offshoring of high-skill-intensive domestic job tasks generates an income
distribution effect similar to unskilled-biased technology changes (Goldin and Katz, 2009).
Second, we derive clear conditions that characterize the offshoring-induced cost-efficiency effect. We
show that the cost-efficiency effect induced by offshoring domestic job tasks, what we refer to as the external
reallocation, is countervailed by an internal reallocation of tasks to domestic workers. More precisely, the
internal reallocation refers to reallocation of offshoring-induced displaced medium-skilled workers to low-
skill- and high-skill-intensive job tasks. The balance between the two forces depends importantly on the
substitutability between medium- and low-skilled workers and between high- and medium-skilled workers
at the respective equilibrium task margins. More precisely, for sufficient low substitutability, the internal
reallocation effect is dominated by the external one. In this case, all domestic skill groups benefit in terms of
higher real wages. The importance of this internal reallocation has been put forward in the recent empirical
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literature (cf. Baumgarten et al., 2013; Hummels et al., 2014).
Finally, we elaborate the implications of the bumping-down effect of medium-skilled workers induced
by easier offshoring for the low-skilled unemployment rate. Our analysis reveals that if the substitutability
between medium- and low-skilled workers at the equilibrium task margin is sufficiently low (i.e. low-skilled
workers have sufficiently higher comparative advantages in performing the domestic job tasks), then the
crowding-out effect is offset by the offshoring-induced cost-efficiency effect, boosting the low-skilled labor
market.
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Appendix
A Cost-efficiency effect
Recall Eq. (17) and take logs to obtain
ln Ω(·) =
[(∫ IL
0
ln
(
βL(i)
βL(IL)
)
di+
∫ 1
IH
ln
(
βH(i)
βH(IH)
)
di+
∫
i∈IO
ln
(
ζ(i)
βO(IO)
)
di−
∫ 1
0
ln(aM (i))di
)]
.
Next, recall the definition of the semi-elasticities of the comparative advantage schedules
εL = −∂ lnβL(IL)
∂IL
> 0, εH = −∂ lnβH(IH)
∂IH
> 0,
∂ lnβO(IO)
∂IO
= µ > 0.
Total differentiation w.r.t. the endogenous margins yields
d ln Ω(·) = lnβL(IL)dIL + IL β
′
L(IL)
βL(IL)
dIL − lnβL(IL)dIL − lnβH(IH)dIH − (1− IH)β
′
H(IH)
βH(IH)
dIH + lnβH(IH)dIH
+
(
ln ζ(I2)dI2 − ln ζ(I1)dI1 − lnβO(IO)dIO
)
− IO β
′
O(IO)
βO(IO)
dIO.
Then, taking into account that the term within the brackets is, by the positive monotone transformation,
discussed in Appendix C.3, null, utilizing the definitions of semi-elasticity, and manipulating further, the
total differentiation reduces to
d ln Ω(·) = −ILεLdIL + (1− IH)εHdIH − IOµdIO. (A.1)
Moreover, using the comparative static results derived in Appendix E.1, we can compute the overall sign of
d ln Ω(·). Utilizing Eqs. (E.2) and (E.4), the internal reallocation effect,R = (1− IH)εH dIHdω − ILεL dILdω , can be
written as
R =
[
(1− IH)2εH(1 + εLIL) + I2LεL(1 + (1− IH)εH)
]
αωIL(1− IH)(IH − IL − IO)∆
=
(1− IH)2εH + I2LεL + (1− IH)ILεHεL(1− (IH − IL))
αωIL(1− IH)(IH − IL − IO)∆ . (A.2)
Next, utilizing Eq. (E.2), the external reallocation effect, E = IOµdIOdω , can be written as
E =
IOµ
[
1− IO + εH(1− IH)[IH − IO + εLIL(IH − IL − IO)] + εLIL(1− IL − IO)
]
αωIL(1− IH)(IH − IL − IO)∆ . (A.3)
Now from Eqs. (A.2) and (A.3), we can derive the sufficient condition that determines the sign of d ln Ω(·)dω =
30
R− E ≶ 0.
(1− IH)2εH + I2LεL + (1− IH)ILεHεL(1− (IH − IL)) ≶ IOµ
[
1− IO + εH(1− IH)(IH − IO)
+εH(1− IH)εLIL(IH − IL − IO) + εLIL(1− IL − IO)
]
.
It can be verified that for a sufficiently low substitutability (i.e. high values of µ) between medium-skilled and
offshore workers the marginal cost of composite labor unambiguously declines, i.e. d ln Ω(·)dω < 0. Formally,
the sufficient condition follows from the magnitude between the third term on the right hand side and the
third term on the left hand side, which yields
µ >
1− (IH − IL)
IO(IH − IL − IO) . (A.4)
Notice that if the sufficient condition (A.4) holds, the first two terms on the left hand side will also be domi-
nated by the other terms on the right hand side.
B Extension: Alternative offshoring scenarios of domestic job tasks
Offshoring low-skill-intensive domestic job tasks
This section provides an analytical discussion of different stages of globalization trends. Particularly, we
discuss the distributional effect when offshoring is limited to other skill segments of domestic tasks, while
keeping the structure of the model unchanged. We commence with the special case as in Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008), where offshoring activities are limited to low-skill-intensive job tasks. We refer to
this case as globalization trends in the past, where the burden was mainly borne by low-skilled workers in
many advanced countries. We then assess the distributional effects of easier offshoring.
First, notice that domestic skill-task allocations defined by Lemma 1 still hold. Then, similar to the case
of offshoring medium-skilled tasks, we impose that the task assignment between low-skilled and offshore
workers will lead to offshoring of a fraction of all low-skilled job tasks in the interval (0, IL). This implies
that domestic firms find it cheaper to install low-skilled workers at the lower and upper ends of all low-skill-
intensive job tasks, while offshoring is cheaper somewhere in the middle. Formally, the assignment problem
is defined by
cO(i) Q cL(i)
or equivalently
τwO
AO
1
aO(i)
Q wL
AL
1
aL(i)
, ∀ i ∈ IL \ I˜O. (B.1)
Multiplying both sides of (B.1) by aM (i) yields the familiar structure of task productivity schedules, i.e. βL(i) =
aL(i)
aM (i)
and ζ˜(i) = aM (i)aO(i) , with the functional properties defined by Assumptions 1 and 2 in the main text. No-
tice the difference between the task productivity schedule ζ˜(i) (imposed here) and ζ(i) (used previously).
While both have the U-shaped functional form, ζ˜(i) indicates a different location over the unit interval. To
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fix ideas, consider, for example, the following simple quadratic function
ζ(i) = exp[gM (i− gO)2],
where gM and gO are parameters and measure the task productivity of medium-skilled and offshore workers
respectively. In this example, it can be easily verified that changes in the task productivity of offshore workers
(gO) will induce a horizontal shift of ζ(i), changes in gM affect the slope, while lower offshoring friction (i.e.
higher values of ω ≡ AOτwO ) leads to a vertical shift of ζ(i)/ω. Notice however that if the comparative advantage
of offshore workers is sufficiently low (i.e. gO = 0), there are no domestic low-skilled workers employed
near the origin, and if they have sufficiently high task productivity (i.e. gO = IL), there are no low-skilled
workers employed between the offshoring interval and the task margin IL. Thus, as derived below, necessary
conditions similar to those derived in Corollary 2 are required for which ζ˜(i) ∈ (0, IL).
The necessary conditions for offshoring activities to be permitted to a sub-range of low-skilled job tasks
are
AL
wL
βL(I˙)ζ˜(I˙) < ω <
AL
wL
βL(IL)ζ˜(IL), and 0 < I˜| ∂ ln ζ˜(·)
∂i =0
< IL, (B.2)
implying that the offshoring friction is not too large (i.e. low values of ω = AOτwO ), defined at the tangent
point I˙ between the productivity schedules
∣∣∣∂βL(I˙)
∂I˙
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∂ζ˜(I˙)
∂I˙
∣∣∣, such that offshoring is permitted, nor too
small, avoiding that low-skilled workers lose their comparative advantage in competing with medium-skilled
workers, defined by the equilibrium task margin IL.19
Then, given Assumptions 1 and 2, and conditions in (B.2), it follows from (B.1) that there must exist two
cut-off margins, similar to Lemma 2, defining the range of offshored low-skilled job tasks, i.e. I˜O = I˜2 − I˜1.
However, as discussed in the main text, by means of simple positive monotone transformation (see
Lemma 3), we obtain
β˜O(I˜O)
ω
=
wL
AL
, (B.3)
where β˜O(IO) is the positive monotone transformation of comparative advantage schedules ζ˜(·)βL(·) at the
new task margins, I˜1 and I˜2, in terms of the offshoring range I˜O.
Thus the allocation of tasks is as follows: low-skilled workers perform all tasks i ∈ IL \ I˜O and offshore
workers perform all tasks i ∈ I˜O. The task allocations between low- and medium-skilled workers and be-
tween high- and medium-skilled workers still hold as defined in Lemma 1, where medium-skilled workers
perform all tasks i ∈ (IL, IH), while high-skilled workers perform all tasks i ∈ [IH , 1]. Figure 5 provides a
graphical illustration.
General equilibrium solution
Equipped with these conditions, we derive the general equilibrium closed solution as follows. From the
cost-minimized first-order conditions, we obtain three equations denoting the relative medium-skilled labor
19It is important to notice that at the tangent point I˙, the domestic firm is indifferent between low-skilled and offshore workers. Thus,
for a positive range of offshoring low-skilled job tasks, I˙O > 0, the offshoring friction must be sufficiently low.
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Figure 5: Offshorability of low-skill-intensive job-tasks and skill-task allocation
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demand
wL
wM
=
NM
NL
IL − I˜O
IH − IL (B.4)
wO
wM
=
NM
nO
I˜O
IH − IL (B.5)
wM
wH
=
NM
NH
IH − IL
1− IH . (B.6)
Recall the no-arbitrage conditions (2) and (3)
wL
wM
=
AL
AM
βL(IL)
(B.7)
wM
wH
=
AM
AH
βH(IH).
To examine changes in the relative demand between medium-skilled and offshore workers, the no-arbitrage
condition (B.3) has to be adjusted for medium-skill unit costs. Thus, dividing both sides of Eq. (B.3) by wM
and using the no-arbitrage condition at IL, Eq. (2), we obtain
wO
wM
=
AO
τ
βL(IL)
AM
1
β˜O(I˜O)
. (B.8)
Moreover, notice the additional endogenous variable in Eq. (B.5): nO, i.e. the employment level of off-
shore workers. To account for the endogenous adjustment of offshore employment level, combine the first-
order condition for offshore labor per task with the resource constraint for offshore workers to obtain
nO
I˜O
=
PEE
wO
=
P
− 1−αα
E B
wO
=
B
wO
(
βL(IL)
−1 τwO
AO
β˜O(I˜O)Ω˜(·)
)− 1−αα
, (B.9)
where the second equality accounts for the adjustment in total employmentE = P−1/αE B. In the third equal-
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ity we utilized the modified no-arbitrage condition (B.8) together with the general equilibrium solution of
the price index PE = wMAM Ω˜(·), where
Ω˜(·) = exp
[∫
i∈I˜O
ln
(
βL(i)ζ˜(i)
β˜O(I˜O)
)
di+
∫ IL
0
ln
(
βL(IL)
βL(i)
)
di+
∫ 1
IH
ln
(
βH(i)
βH(IH)
)
di−
∫ 1
0
ln aM (i)di
]
.
Moreover, the convenient structure of the generalized common part of the marginal cost of factor labor Ω˜(·)
is preserved. To see this, define the semi-elasticities at the offshoring margin µ˜ ≡ ∂ ln β˜O(I˜O)
∂I˜O
> 0. Taking the
total differentiation w.r.t. the endogenous task margins yields
d ln Ω˜(·) =
(
ln ζ˜(I˜O) + βL(I˜O)− ln β˜O(I˜O)
)
dI˜O − I˜Oµ˜dI˜O
+
(
lnβL(IL)− lnβL(IL)
)
dIL − ILεLdIL
+
(
lnβH(IH)− lnβH(IH)
)
dIH + (1− IH)εHdIH .
By the positive monotone transformation the bracket in the first line is zero. The brackets in the second and
third lines are also zero, yielding
d ln Ω˜(·) = (1− IH)εHdIH − ILεLdIL − I˜Oµ˜dI˜O. (B.10)
Thus, similar to the discussion in the main text, the impact on the generalized marginal cost of labor can
be decomposed into three terms. As shown in Eq. (B.10), the direct source of the productivity effect due
to offshoring is captured by I˜Oµ˜dI˜O. The first two terms, (1− IH)εHdIH and ILεLdIL, allow for endogenous
reallocation of domestic workers. This is what we refer to as the internal reallocation effect. Again, notice the
contrast to the original task-based approach by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), where only the former
channel is captured. Thus Eq. (B.10) can be seen as the generalization of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008) regarding skill heterogeneity.
Next, utilize the previously derived Eqs. (B.22), (B.8) and (B.9) in the relative demand equations (B.4)–
(B.6). Then, after manipulating, rearranging and taking logs, we obtain the general equilibrium closed solu-
tion for the three endogenous task margins I˜O, IL and IH :
ln
(
ALNL
AMNM
)
= − lnβL(IL) + ln
(
IL − I˜O
)
− ln (IH − IL)
ln
( B
AMNM
)
+
1
α
lnω = − 1
α
(
lnβL(IL)− lnβL(I˜O)− ln β˜O(I˜O)
)
− ln (IH − IL) + 1− α
α
ln Ω˜(·) (B.11)
AMNM
AHNH
= − lnβH(IH) + ln (IH − IL)− ln (1− IH) .
This 3×3 system of equations (B.11) can be utilized to compute the implicit solutions for the endogenous
task margins due to any exogenous changes that are captured on the right hand sides.
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Comparative statics: Easier offshoring and skill-task reallocation
Taking the total differentiation of the system (B.11) yields

(
εL +
1
IL−I˜O
+ 1
IH−IL
)
− 1
IL−I˜O
− 1
IH−IL(
[1− (1− α)IL] εLα + 1IH−IL
)
[1− (1− α)I˜O] µ˜α
(
1−α
α
(1− IH)εH − 1IH−IL
)
1
IH−IL 0
(
εH +
1
IH−IL +
1
1−IH
)


dIL
dI˜O
dIH
 =

0
1
αω
0
dω.
(B.12)
Computing the determinant of the 3× 3 matrix yields
∆ =
1
α(1− IH)(IL − I˜O)(IH − IL)3[(
1− IL + (1− IH)(IH − IL)εH
)
×(
µ˜(IH − IL)
(
(IL − I˜O)(IH − IL)εL + (IH − I˜O)
)(
1− (1− α)I˜O
)
+(IL − I˜O)
(
(IH − IL)εL (1− (1− α)IL)
))
+
(
1 + (1− IH)εH
)
(IL − I˜O)(IH − IL)α
+(1− IH)(IL − I˜O)
(
(1− α)(IH − IL)
(
(1− IH)εH − µ˜I˜O
)
+ µ˜(IH − IL)
)]
> 0.
It is evident that all terms in the numerator are positive, implying that ∆ is positive too. Given this result,
the implicit solutions for the task margins due to easier offshoring are
dIL
dω
=
1
∆
εH +
1
1−IH +
1
IH−IL
α(IH − IL)ω > 0
dI˜O
dω
=
1
∆
1
α(1− IH)(IL − I˜O)(IH − IL)2ω[(
(1− IH)(IH − IL)εH + (1− IH) + (IH − IL)
)(
(IL − I˜O)(IH − IL)εL + (IL − I˜O) + (IH − IL)
)
+(1− IH)(IL − I˜O)
]
> 0
dIH
dω
=
1
∆
1
α(IH − IL)2ω > 0.
The following proposition summarizes the main results.
Proposition 8 (Offshoring low-skilled job-tasks and skill-task reallocation). If offshoring activities are per-
mitted only to low-skill-intensive job tasks, then there exists an equilibrium threshold I˜O at which domestic
firms allocate offshore workers to all tasks i ∈ I˜O, where 0 < I˜O < IL < IH < 1. Moreover, easier offshoring
(dω > 0) induces an expansion of offshorable job-tasks as well as a job-task upgrading by low- and medium-
skilled workers, i.e.
dI˜O
dω
>
dIL
dω
>
dIH
dω
> 0. (B.13)
Given these comparative statics, we can now investigate how offshoring affects both real and relative wages
of domestic workers. We relegate the discussion on relative wages to the main text and focus here on real
wage effects.
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Offshoring low-skilled job tasks and productivity effect
To investigate the impact of offshoring low-skilled job tasks on real wages, recall the first-order conditions
defining the optimal labor demand, and utilize the resource constraint conditions and the optimal demand
condition for total employment, to obtain
wL =
IL − I˜O
NL
PEE =
IL − I˜O
NL
P
− 1−α
α
E B
wM =
IH − IL
NM
PEE =
IH − IL
NM
P
− 1−α
α
E B
wH =
1− IH
NH
PEE =
1− IH
NH
P
− 1−α
α
E B.
Next, combine the no-arbitrage condition (B.22) with the cost index of composite labor PE = wMAM Ω˜(·) to
substitute for wMAM in the inverse labor demand function of low- and high-skilled workers, respectively. Then,
after further manipulation, we obtain
wL =
(
IL − I˜O
NL
)α
βL(IL)
1−αΩ˜(·)−(1−α)A1−αL Bα
wM =
(
IH − IL
NM
)α
Ω˜(·)−(1−α)A1−αM Bα
wH =
(
1− IH
NH
)α
βH(IH)
−(1−α)Ω˜(·)−(1−α)A1−αH Bα.
Taking logs and totally differentiating w.r.t. offshoring friction, the wage effect can be decomposed into the
following terms:
d lnwL
dω
=
(
α
IL − I˜O
− (1− α)εL)
)
dIL
dω
+ (1− α)
(
ILεL
dIL
dω
− (1− IH)εH dIH
dω
)
+
(
(1− α)I˜Oµ˜− α
IL − I˜O
)
dI˜O
dω
(B.14)
d lnwM
dω
=
(
α
IH − IL − (1− α)(1− IH)εH
)
dIH
dω
+
(
(1− α)ILεL − α
IH − IL
)
dIL
dω
+ (1− α)I˜Oµ˜dI˜O
dω
(B.15)
d lnwH
dω
=
(
(1− α)IHεH − α
1− IH
)
dIH
dω
+ (1− α)
(
ILεL
dIL
dω
+ I˜Oµ˜
dI˜O
dω
)
. (B.16)
The last term, (1− α)I˜Oµ˜, in all three Eqs. (B.14)–(B.16) captures the aforementioned productivity effect.
Notice that in Eq. (B.14) this productivity effect is interacting with the direct displacement effect of low-
skilled workers, α
IL−I˜O . However, comparing our results with that of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008),
the important difference becomes evident. Next to the direct offshoring-induced productivity effect, there
are two additional forces: the first and second terms in Eqs. (B.14)–(B.16) capture the internal realloca-
tion effect. The extent of this internal reallocation effect depends on the substitutability between low- and
medium-skilled workers as well as between medium- and high-skilled workers, which are captured by the
relative task productivity parameters (semi-elasticities) εL and εH , respectively. The following proposition
summarizes the sufficient conditions.
Proposition 9 (Offshoring low-skilled job tasks and productivity effect). Given the impact of easier offshoring
on the task reallocation derived in Proposition 8, an offshoring-induced cost-efficiency effect raises unambigu-
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ously the real wage of all skill groups for the sufficient conditions
1. εLIL > εH(1− IH),
2. α1−α
1
IL−I˜O > εL >
α
1−α
1
IL(IH−IL) , for I˜O > IL[1− (IH − IL)]
3. α1−α
1
(1−IH)(IH−IL) > εH >
α
1−α
1
IH(1−IH)
4. µ˜ > α1−α
1
I˜O(IL−I˜O) .
Proof. The sufficient condition in Part 1. follows from the second term in Eq. (B.14) and the comparative
static results dILdω and
dIH
dω in Proposition 8. It states that for sufficient low substitutability between low-
and medium-skilled workers compared to substitutability between medium- and high-skilled workers in
the neighborhood of IL and IH , respectively, offshoring-induced internal reallocation of workers is limited.
If this sufficient condition holds, then the second term in Eq. (B.14) is unambiguously positive. In Part 2., the
lower boundary of εL is computed from the second term in Eq. (B.15), while the upper boundary follows from
the first term in Eq. (B.14). Thus these conditions determine the sufficient range of values of substitutability
between low- and medium-skilled workers. Notice however the qualifying necessary condition in this case
that requires a sufficiently large range of offshoring. If this necessary condition does not hold, than the lower
boundary in Part 2. becomes binding, implying that the first term in Eq. (B.14) will have a negative sign.
However, it is worth noting that, even in this case, the real wage of low-skilled workers might increase if the
two other positive terms in Eq. (B.14) are sufficiently strong. In Part 3., the lower boundary is computed from
the first term in Eq. (B.16), while the upper boundary follows from the first term in Eq. (B.15). Finally, in Part
4., the sufficient condition following from the last term in Eq. (B.14) requires a sufficiently low substitutability
between medium-skilled and offshore workers. 
For these jointly sufficient conditions, the offshoring-induced labor supply effect on wages, characterized
by the internal reallocation of domestic workers, is dominated by the overall rise in total domestic employ-
ment induced by the cost-efficiency effect due to lower offshoring frictions. This feature extends the models
of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
Offshoring high-skill-intensive domestic job tasks
As put forward in ?, many high-skill-intensive occupations might be affected by offshoring. Our framework
can also be easily extended to account for this possible future development of globalization. To get an idea,
we sketch the main properties followed by a graphical illustration.
In a similar vein, one can derive conditions characterizing the task allocation between offshore and high-
skilled workers. Considering the example of the quadratic function from above, the convenient property of
the U-shaped task productivity schedule can be seen. In this case, the rise in international competition on
domestic high-skill-intensive job-tasks can be described by an improvement in task productivity of offshore
workers. Formally, we state
ζˆ(i) = exp[gM (i− gˆO)2],
where now gˆO > gO > g˜O > 0. Thus the U-shaped curve moves rightwards along the unit interval. Figure 6
provides a graphical illustration.
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Figure 6: Offshoring high-skilled job tasks and skill-task allocation
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Similar to the case of offshoring low-skilled job tasks, the task assignment between offshore and high-
skilled workers will lead to unbundling of a fraction of high-skilled job tasks. This implies again that high-
skilled workers are relatively cheaper in producing job tasks in the neighborhoods of IH and 1, while offshore
workers are cheaper somewhere in the middle. Formally, the assignment problem can be written as
cO(i) Q cH(i),
or equivalently
τwO
AO
1
aO(i)
Q wH
AH
1
aH(i)
, ∀ i ∈ (IH , 1). (B.17)
Now, by a simple transformation, i.e. multiplying both sides in Eq. (B.17) by aM (i), we obtain the task pro-
ductivity schedules, βH(i) =
aM (i)
aH(i)
and ζˆ(i) = aM (i)aO(i) , with the same properties defined by Assumptions 1 and
2. Again the structure of the model is preserved. Now the necessary conditions for offshoring to be permitted
to a subrange of high-skilled job tasks are
AH
wH
βH(I¨)
−1ζˆ(I¨) < ω <
AH
wH
βH(IH)
−1ζˆ(IH), and IH < Iˆ| ∂ ln ζˆ(·)
∂i =0
< 1, (B.18)
implying that the offshoring friction is not too large (i.e. low values of ω = AOτwO ), defined at the tangent point
I˙ between the productivity schedules
∣∣∣∂βH(I¨)
∂I¨
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∂ζ˜(I¨)
∂I¨
∣∣∣, such that offshoring is permitted, nor too small,
so that high-skilled workers do not lose their comparative advantage in competing with medium-skilled
workers, defined by the task margin IH . Then, given the assumptions and properties in (B.18), it follows
from (B.17) that there must exist two cut-off margins defining the range of offshored high-skill-intensive job
tasks (IˆO). By means of simple positive monotone transformation, this no-arbitrage condition is given by
βˆO(IˆO)
ω
=
wH
AH
, (B.19)
where βˆO(·) denotes the positive monotone transformation of relative task productivity schedules ζˆ(·)βH(·) at
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the new task margins, Iˆ1 and Iˆ2, in terms of the offshoring range IˆO.
Notice again that the no-arbitrage conditions defining the domestic allocation of tasks to skills are pre-
served by Lemma 1. Thus the allocation of tasks across the different types of labor is as follows: low-skilled
workers perform all tasks i ∈ IL, medium-skilled workers perform all tasks i ∈ (IH − IL), high-skilled work-
ers perform all tasks i ∈ (1 − IH − IˆO), and offshore workers perform all tasks i ∈ IˆO; see Figure 5 for these
equilibrium allocations.
Offshoring and domestic income distribution effect
For the computation of the relative wage effects of offshoring, discussed in the main text, we need to adjust
the relative labor demand between high- and medium-skilled workers for the range of offshoring IˆO. This
follows from the new resource constraint for high-skilled workers and from the cost-minimized first-order
conditions, from which the relative medium-skilled labor demand functions can be derived
wL
wM
=
NM
NL
IL
IH − IL (B.20)
wM
wH
=
NM
NH
IH − IL
1− IH − IˆO
. (B.21)
Recall the no-arbitrage conditions (2) and (3)
wL
wM
=
AL
AM
βL(IL)
(B.22)
wM
wH
=
AM
AH
βH(IH).
This set of Eqs. (B.20), (B.21) and (B.22) can be utilized to assess the impact of a marginal decline of offshoring
friction on the relative domestic wages. For an intuitive and graphical discussion we refer the reader to
discussion in section 5.2 in the main text.
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Supplementary Mathematical Appendix
C Proofs of Lemmata
C.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We proceed as follows. A task is allocated to a low-skilled worker rather than to a medium-skilled
worker as long as
cL(i) ≤ cM (i)
⇔ wL
ALaL(i)
≤ wM
AMaM (i)
⇔ wL
AL
aM (i)
aL(i)
≤ wM
AM
,
which, by Assumption 1, leads to Eq. (2) in Lemma 1 with βL(IL) =
aM (IL)
aL(IL)
. Similarly, tasks are allocated to
medium-skilled workers as long as they are more productive relative to high-skilled workers. That is,
cM (i) ≤ cH(i)
⇔ wM
AMaM (i)
≤ wH
AHaH(i)
⇔ wM
AM
≤ aM (i)
aH(i)
wH
AH
,
which, by Assumption 1, leads to Eq. (3) in Lemma 1 with βH(IH) =
aM (IH)
aH(IH)
. Finally, with a similar argument
firms allocate tasks between low and high skills according to
cL(i) ≤ cH(i)
⇔ wL
ALaL(i)
≤ wH
AHaH(i)
⇔ wL
AL
aM (i)
aL(i)
≤ aM (i)
aH(i)
wH
AH
,
where, in the third inequality, we multiplied both sides by aM (i). By Assumption 1, we obtain Eq. (4) in
Lemma 1 with βL(I˜) =
aM (I˜)
aL(I˜)
and βH(I˜) =
aM (I˜)
aH(I˜)
. 
C.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Similar to the discussion in Lemma 1, the allocation decision in Lemma 2 is based on cost efficiency. How-
ever, notice that by Assumption 2 there is a non-linear relationship between the unit costs of medium-skilled
and offshore workers. Formally, the allocation problem can be written as
cM (i) Q cO(i)
⇔ wM
AMaM (i)
Q τwO
AOaO(i)
⇔ wM
AM
Q ζ(i)
ω
,
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where ∂ζ(i)∂i < 0, ∀ i < Iˇ
∣∣
∂ζ(i)
∂i =0
and ∂ζ(i)∂i > 0, ∀ i > Iˇ
∣∣
∂ζ(i)
∂i =0
. Thus, by the jointly necessary conditions in
Corollary 2 there must exist two cut-off points at which cM (·) − cO(·) = 0. These are defined by (5) and (6),
where
wM
AM
<
ζ(i)
ω
, ∀ i < I1 and i > I2
wM
AM
>
ζ(i)
ω
, ∀ i ∈ (I1, I2).
The boundaries on ω in Corollary 2 defined as follows. The lower boundary follows from
cO(Iˇ) < cM (Iˇ)
⇔ AM
wM
ζ(Iˇ) < ω,
with Iˇ denoting the minimum point of ζ(i), i.e. ∂ζ(i)∂i = 0. In a similar vein, one can derive the upper bound-
aries, respectively, at the low- and high-skill-extensive margins, i.e. cO(IL) > cM (IL) and cO(IH) > cM (IH).
Note again that the lower boundaries ensure that offshored job-tasks are a subset of the overall medium
skill-intensive range of tasks, i.e. (I1, I2) ∈ (IL, IH). 
C.3 Proof of Lemma 3
To keep the analytical analysis tractable, it is useful to look at changes in the offshoring interval, which re-
flect implicitly changes in the extensive offshoring margins, I1 and I2. In fact, all we need to show is how
an endogenous change in the length of offshoring interval affects the domestic job-task margins, IL and IH .
Thus we need to find a condition that satisfies the no-arbitrage condition between medium-skilled and off-
shore workers for the length of the offshoring interval (IO), accounting implicitly for the two endogenous
offshoring cut-off points I1 and I2.
First, define w˜M ≡ wMωAM after recalling the two no-arbitrage conditions (5) and (6)
w˜M = ζ(I1),
w˜M = ζ(I2),
and the definition of the length of offshoring interval
IO = I2 − I1.
Next, recall the semi-elasticities at the two extensive offshoring margins, i.e. ε1 = −∂ ln ζ(I1)∂I1 > 0 and ε2 =
∂ ln ζ(I2)
∂I2
> 0. Taking the total differentiation, we obtain
d ln w˜M = −ε1dI1,
d ln w˜M = ε2dI2,
dIO = dI2 − dI1.
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Utilizing the first two equations in the last one yields
dIO = d ln w˜M
(
1
ε2
+
1
ε1
)
.
It is convenient to define µ = ε2ε1ε2+ε1 > 0, which is increasing in both arguments. Then, after further manipu-
lation, we obtain
d ln w˜M = µdIO.
This is a simple first-order linear homogeneous ordinary differential equation. Thus, by integration∫
d ln w˜Mdi =
∫
µdIOdi,
we obtain a unique solution
wM
AM
=
βO(IO)
ω
,
where βO(IO) = exp[µIO]. 
D Firm’s optimization problem
Optimal labor demand
Utilizing (8) in (10), then the Lagrangian to the cost-minimizing problem (12) is read as follows:
L =
[
wL
∫ IL
0
lL(i)di+ wM
∫
i∈SM
lM (i)di+ wO
∫
i∈IO
lO(i)di+ wH
∫ 1
IH
lH(i)di
]
+λ
[
E − exp
[∫ IL
0
ln(ALaL(i)lL(i))di+
∫
i∈SM
ln(AMaM (i)lM (i))di
+
∫
i∈IO
ln(AOaO(i)lO(i)/τ)di+
∫ 1
IH
ln(AHaH(i)lH(i))di
]]
,
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier. The first-order conditions w.r.t. lk(i), k = {L,M,H,O}, and E are,
respectively, given:
∂L
∂lL(i)
= wL − λ E
lL(i)
= 0, ⇒ lL(i) = lL(i′) = lL, ∀ i ∈ [0, IL] (D.23)
∂L
∂lM (i)
= wM − λ E
lM (i)
= 0, ⇒ lM (i) = lM (i′) = lM , ∀ i ∈ SM (D.24)
∂L
∂lH(i)
= wH − λ E
lH(i)
= 0, ⇒ lH(i) = lH(i′) = lH , ∀ i ∈ [IH , 1] (D.25)
∂L
∂lO(i)
= wO − λ E
lO(i)
= 0, ⇒ lO(i) = lO(i′) = lO, ∀ i ∈ IO. (D.26)
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The first-order conditions (D.23)–(D.26) indicate that the marginal productivity of workers across the re-
spective range of tasks is similar and thus the required number of workers per task does not vary across the
respective range of tasks. Utilizing these conditions in the constraint (10) and rearranging, we obtain
λ = exp
[∫ IL
0
ln
(
wL
ALaL(i)
)
di+
∫
i∈SM
ln
(
wM
AMaM (i)
)
di (D.27)
+
∫
i∈IO
ln
(
τwO
AOaO(i)
)
di+
∫ 1
IH
ln
(
wH
AHaH(i)
)
di
]
.
By the envelope theorem, the marginal (average) cost of the labor composite is denoted by the shadow price,
i.e. ∂L∂E = λ. Thus, under perfect competition, the marginal cost equals the cost index of composite labor
mentioned in the text, i.e. PE = λ.
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E General equilibrium solution for changes in task margins
E.1 Comparative statics for changes in offshoring
Utilizing these observations and taking the total differentiation of the 3× 3 system of equations in (22) w.r.t. ω, yields

(
1
IL
+ εL +
1
IH−IL−IO
)
1
IH−IL−IO −
1
IH−IL−IO(
1
IH−IL−IO −
1−α
α
ILεL
) (
[1− (1− α)IO] µα + 1IH−IL−IO
) (
1−α
α
(1− IH)εH − 1IH−IL−IO
)
− 1
IH−IL−IO −
1
IH−IL−IO
(
1
1−IH + εH +
1
IH−IL−IO
)


dIL
dIO
dIH
 =

0
1
αω
0
dω. (E.1)
Computing the determinant of the 3× 3 matrix, we obtain
∆3×3 =
1
α(1− IH)IL(IH − IL − IO)[
α+ ILεL(α+ µ(1− IL − IO)(1− (1− α)IO) + (1− α)IL) + µ(1− (1− α)IO)(1− IO)
+(1− IH)εH
(
1− (1− α)IH + ILεL
[
1− (1− α)(IH − IL) + µM(1− (1− α)IO)
]
+ µ(IH − IO)(1− (1− α)IO)
)]
> 0.
Given the positive sign of the determinant ∆ and applying Cramer’s Rule, the solution to the 3 × 3 system (E.1) yields the following effects on the task
margins:
dIL
dω
= − 1 + εH (1− IH)
αω (1− IH) (IH − IL − IO)
1
∆
< 0 (E.2)
dIO
dω
=
1− IO + εH (1− IH) [IH − IO + εLIL (IH − IL − IO)] + εL (1− IL − IO) IL
αω (1− IH) IL (IH − IL − IO) ∆ > 0 (E.3)
dIH
dω
=
1 + εLIL
αωIL (IH − IL − IO)
1
∆
> 0. (E.4)
Moreover, it can be verified that ∣∣∣∣dIOdω
∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣dIHdω
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣dILdω
∣∣∣∣
⇔ 1− IO + εH (1− IH) [IH − IO + εLIL (IH − IL − IO)] + εL (1− IL − IO) IL > (1− IH)(1 + εLIL) + IL(1 + εH (1− IH))
⇒ (1 + εH (1− IH))(1 + εLIL) > 0. (E.5)
44E.2 Comparative statics for changes in minimum wage
Take the total differentiation of the 3× 3 system of equations (37) w.r.t. to the minimum wage W¯ , and rearrange to obtain

(
1
IH−IL−IO +
(1−(1−α)IL)εL
α
) (
1
IH−IL−IO −
(1−α)µIO
α
) (
(1−α)(1−IH)εH
α − 1IH−IL−IO
)
(
1
IH−IL−IO −
(1−α)ILεL
α
) (
µ(1−(1−α)IO)
α +
1
IH−IL−IO
) (
(1−α)(1−IH)εH
α − 1IH−IL−IO
)
− 1IH−IL−IO − 1IH−IL−IO
(
εH +
1
1−IH +
1
IH−IL−IO
)


dIL
dIO
dIH
 =

− 1
αW¯
0
0
 dW¯ . (E.6)
Computing the determinant of the 3× 3 matrix, we obtain
∆˜3×3 =
1
α2 (1− IH) (IH − IL − IO)
[αµ+ εH (1− IH) (εL [IH (−1 + α+ µ[1− (1− α) (IL + IO)])− µ (IL + IO) [1− (1− α)(IL + IO)] + 1] + µ[1− (1− α)IH ])
+εL (α+ µ(1− (IL + IO) [1 + (1− α)(1− (IL + IO)])] > 0. (E.7)
Given the positive sign of ∆˜ and applying Cramer’s Rule, the solution to the 3× 3 system (E.6) yields
dIL
dW¯
= − 1
∆˜
1
α2W¯ (1− IH) (IH − IL − IO)
(α− µIL (1− εH (1− IH)) (1− (1− α)IO)− εH (1− IH) [−IH (α+ µ+ (α− 1)µIO − 1) + µIO (1− (1− α)IO)− 1]
+µ(1− IO)[1− (1− α)IO]) < 0
dIO
dW¯
=
1
∆˜
1
α2W¯ (1− IH) (IH − IL − IO)
[α+ εH (1− IH) [1 + (1− α) (IH + εLIL (IH − IL − IO))]− (1− α)εLIL (1− (IL + IO))] > 0
dIH
dW¯
= − 1
∆˜
µ(1− (1− α)IO) + (1− α)εLIL
α2W¯ (IH − IL − IO) < 0.
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E.3 Comparative statics for changes in offshoring under minimum wage scheme
To compute the impact of easier offshoring on the equilibrium task margins, take the total differentiation of the 3 × 3 system (37) w.r.t. the offshoring
parameter ω, and rearrange to obtain

(
1
IH−IL−IO +
(1−(1−α)IL)εL
α
) (
1
IH−IL−IO −
(1−α)µIO
α
) (
(1−α)(1−IH)εH
α − 1IH−IL−IO
)
(
1
IH−IL−IO −
(1−α)ILεL
α
) (
µ(1−(1−α)IO)
α +
1
IH−IL−IO
) (
(1−α)(1−IH)εH
α − 1IH−IL−IO
)
− 1IH−IL−IO − 1IH−IL−IO
(
εH +
1
1−IH +
1
IH−IL−IO
)


dIL
dIO
dIH
 =

0
1
αω
0
 dω. (E.8)
Given the positive sign of the determinant matrix on the left hand side, derived in Eq. (E.7), and applying Cramer’s Rule, the solution to the 3 × 3
system (E.8), we obtain the following solutions of the comparative statics:
dIL
dω
= − 1
∆˜
1
α2ω (1− IH) (IH − IL − IO)
α− (1− α)µIO (εH (1− IH) (IH − IL) + 1− IL) + (1− α)µI2O (1 + (1− IH) εH) + εH (1− IH) (1− (1− α)IH)
dIO
dω
= − 1
∆˜
1
α2ω (IH − 1) (IH − IL − IO)
[α+ εH (1− IH) (εL (1− (1− α)IL) (IH − IL − IO) + 1− (1− α)IH) + εL (1− IL − IO) (1− (1− α)IL)] > 0
dIH
dω
=
1
∆˜
εL (1− (1− α)IL) + (1− α)µIO
α2ω (IH − IL − IO) > 0.
46E.4 Comparative statics for changes in offshoring under endogenous low-skilled labor supply
Recall the 4× 4 system of equations (42). Taking total differentiation w.r.t. ω, we obtain

εL +
1
IL
+ 1IH−IL−IO
1
IH−IL−IO − 1IH−IL−IO 11−uL
1
IH−IL−IO −
(1−α)ILεL
α
µ(1−(1−α)IO)
α +
1
IH−IL−IO
(1−α)(1−IH)εH
α − 1IH−IL−IO 0
− 1IH−IL−IO − 1IH−IL−IO εH + 11−IH + 1IH−IL−IO 0
(1− α) (1− IL) εL − αIL −(1− α)IOµ (1− α) (1− IH) εH −
(
α
1−uL +
δ˜
uL
)

×

dIL
dIO
dIH
duL

=

0
1
αω
0
0

dω. (E.9)
Computing the determinant of the matrix yields
˙˜∆4×4 = − 1
α(1− IH)IL(IH − IL − IO) (1− uL)uL(
δ˜
[
α+ ILεL[α+ µ(1− IL − IO)(1− (1− α)P ) + (1− α)IL] + µ(1− (1− α)IO)(1− IO)
+(1− IH)εH
(
ILεL[1− (1− α)(IH − IL) + µ(IH − IL − IO)(1− (1− α)IO)] + µ(IH − IO)(1− (1− α)IO)− (1− α)IH
)]
+ILuL
[
αµ+ εL[µ(1− IL − IO)(1− (1− α)(IL + IO)) + α]
+(1− IH)εH (µ(1− (1− α)IH) + εL[1− (1− α)IH + µ(IH − IL − IO)(1− (1− α)(IL + IO))])
])
< 0.
All four terms in the numerator are positive and thus ˙˜∆ < 0. Given the negative sign of ˙˜∆ and applying Cramer’s Rule, the solution to the 4 × 4 system
(E.9) yields the following unambiguous effects on
• the low-skilled job-task margin
dIL
dω
=
1
˙˜∆
1
αω (1− IH) (1− uL)uL (IH − IL − IO)[
δ˜ + uL
(
α+ (α− 1)µIO (εH (1− IH) (IH − IL) + 1− IL) + (1− α)µI2O (1 + εH (1− IH)) + εH (1− IH) (1− (1− α)IH)
)
+εH δ˜ (1− IH)
]
< 0 (E.10)
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• the offshoring job-task margin
dIO
dω
= − 1
˙˜∆
1
αω (1− IH) IL (1− uL)uL (IH − IL − IO)[
αILuL + δ˜ [1− IO (1 + εH (1− IH))] + εH (1− IH)
(
ILuL (1− (1− α)IH) + δ˜IH
)
+εLIL
[
εH (1− IH) (IH − IL − IO) + 1− IL − IO
] (
δ˜ + (1− (1− α)IL)uL
) ]
> 0. (E.11)
• the high-skilled job-task margin
dIH
dω
= − 1
˙˜∆
IL
[
µuLIO(1− α) + εL
(
δ˜ + uL (1− (1− α)IL)
)]
+ δ˜
αωIL (1− uL)uL (IH − IL − IO) > 0 (E.12)
• the low-skilled unemployment rate
duL
dω
= − 1
˙˜∆
1
α(1− IH)IL(IH − IL − IO)ω[
α+ (1− IH)εH
(
1− (1− α)[IH + µIO(IH − IO)]
)
−(1− α)ILεL
(
(1− IH)εH [IH − IL + µ(IH − IL − IO)IO] + µIO(1− IL − IO) + 1− IL
)
− (1− α)µIO(1− IO)
]
≶ 0 (E.13)
To determine the sign of duLdω , notice first the following limiting case, when offshoring is strongly limited, such that IO → 0. Then, the term in the square
brackets reduces to
α+ (1− IH)εH −
(
(1− IH)εH(1− α)IH + (1− α)ILεL(1− IH)εH(IH − IL) + (1− α)ILεL(1− IL)
)
, (E.14)
where only the first two terms are positive. Thus, as offshoring becomes easier, the terms in the brackets become larger. However, we can define sufficient
conditions so that (E.13) is always negative, irrespective of the level of offshoring. The first condition follows from the interaction between α and the first
term within the brackets in (E.14):
εH >
α
(1− α)IH(1− IH) .
The second condition follows from the interaction between (1− IH)εH and the second term in (E.14)
εL >
1
(1− α)IL(IH − IL) .
The intuition behind this condition is provided in the main text; see discussion of Proposition 7.
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F Proof of Proposition 1: Uniqueness of Task Margins
To verify the uniqueness of the equilibrium task margins, we discuss the equilibrium properties of the do-
mestic task margins from system (21). The proof of the claim regarding uniqueness of offshoring margins
needs further elaboration. We commence with the equilibrium characteristics of the margins IL and IH .
Uniqueness of domestic task margins
From (21a), we can rearrange so that
IH = (I2 − I1) + (1 +ALβL(IL)) IL ≡ IO + FL(IL). (21a′)
Analogously, (21c) can be rearranged so that
IL = −(I2 − I1) + IH −AHβH(IH)(1− IH) ≡ −IO + FH(IH), (21c′)
where AL ≡ AMNMALNL and AH ≡ AMNMAHNH summarize the exogenous labor-augmenting technology and labor
endowment variables. Therefore Eqs. (21a′) and (21c′) highlight the general equilibrium relation between
IL and IH for any given value of IO ∈ (IL, IH). Hence any changes in the offshoring extensive margins will
shift (21a′) and (21c′), while changes in IL and IH , captured by Fk(·), k = {L,H}, affect the slope. To verify
the single-crossing between Eqs. (21a′) and (21c′), we need to examine the properties of the slope of the two
curves.
Consider first the properties of Eq. (21a′). It can be shown that IH is monotonically increasing in IL.
Recalling the property β′L(IL) > 0, then the first derivative implies
∂FL
∂IL
= 1 +AL[βL(IL) + β′L(IL)IL] > 0,
indicating that the slope of (21a′) is larger than unity.
Moreover, it indicates that the increase at the low-skill-intensive task margin is accompanied by a reduc-
tion of high-skill-intensive tasks, i.e. lower (1 − IH). Intuitively, this implies that the tasks previously per-
formed by medium-skilled workers at IL are now produced by low-skilled workers. This induces an excess
of the medium-skilled labor supply due to the Walrasian nature of the labor markets. Thus medium-skilled
wages will decline, so that they become more competitive at the high-skill-extensive task margin IH . This is
then accompanied by increase in IH .
The monotonic relation between IL and IH depends on the properties of the second derivative, which in
turn depends on the functional properties of the productivity schedule βL(·). To examine these properties,
we proceed as follows. Let βL(i) be a homogeneous function of degree 1 ≥ λL > 0, indicating a concave
function. Then, it is generally valid |β′L(i)| > |β
′′
L(i)|. If, on the other hand, βL(i) is homogeneous of degree
λL > 1 (indicating a convex function), then 0 < β
′
L(i) < β
′′
L(i). Thus, for any functional property of βL(·),
the second derivative yields ∂
2FL
∂I2L
= AL(2β′L(IL) + β
′′
L(IL)IL) > 0. This indicates that FL is monotonically
increasing in IL. Furthermore, computing the limits of FL over the range defined by Corollaries 1 and 2,
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yields
lim
IL→0
FL = 0 ⇒ lim
IL→0
IH = I2 − I1 = IO
(F.15)
lim
IL→I1
FL = I1 +ALβL(I1)I1 ⇒ lim
IL→I1
IH = I2 +ALβL(I1)I1.
Next consider Eq. (21c′). Similarly, it can be verified that IL is monotonically increasing in IH , again for any
(fixed) values of IO ∈ (IL, IH). Recall the property β′H(IH) < 0, then formally
∂FH
∂IH
= 1 +AH[βH(IH)− β′H(IH)(1− IH)] > 0,
implying a slope of (21c′) larger than unity. In a similar vein, if βH(i) is homogeneous of degree−1 < λH < 0
(i.e. a concave functional form), then β
′′
H(i) < β
′
H(i) < 0. If βH(i) is a homogeneous function of degree
λH < −1 (indicating a convex functional form), then β′H(i) < 0 < β
′′
H(i). Thus, computing the second
derivative yields ∂
2FH
∂I2H
= AH(2β′H(IH)− β
′′
H(IH)(1− IH)) < 0. Similarly, computing the limits of FH over the
range defined by Corollaries 1 and 2, we get
lim
IH→I2
FH = I2 −AHβH(I2)(1− I2) ⇒ lim
IH→I2
IL = −(AHβH(I2)(1− I2)− I1)
(F.16)
lim
IH→1
FH = 1 ⇒ lim
IH→1
IL = 1− (I2 − I1).
Utilizing the properties of FL and FH derived in (F.15) and (F.16), we can depict Eqs. (21a′) and (21c′) in the
(IL, IH)-space. The graphical illustration in Figure 7 reveals the single crossing between the two curves for
all values within the bounded intervals.
Obviously, if the offshoring range becomes very large such that IO /∈ (IL, IH), then the intersection of
the two curves, given by Eqs. (21a′) and (21c′), will be off the unit interval. More precisely, an increase
Figure 7: Unique equilibrium of low- and high-skilled task margins
IH
IL
1
10
I2 − I1
1− (I2 − I1)
IH
IL Iˇ
Iˇ
Eq. (21a’) Eq. (21c’)
I2I1
I1
I2
I2 +ALβL(I1)I1
−(AHβH(I2)(1− I2)− I1)
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in IO = (I2 − I1) induces a parallel left-ward shift in the two curves implying unambiguously an increase
in IH and a decline in IL.20 The fact that there is a parallel shift can be seen by computing the limits of
(21a′) and (21c′) over the unit interval. Formally this is given by limIL→1 IH = 1 + (I2 − I1) + ALβL(1) and
limIH→0 IH = −((I2 − I1) + AHβH(0). Thus it is readily evident that changes in the set of offshorable tasks
lead to a shift in both curves, whereas changes in factor-biased technology or endowments captured by the
terms AL and AH will also affect the slope of both curves. We summarize by the following Lemma the first
sufficient condition.
Lemma 4. For any given values of IO ∈ (IL, IH), Eqs. (21a′) and (21c′) determine the unique values of IL and
IH in the (IL, IH)-space.
Unique solution of offshoring task margins
In order to assess the uniqueness of the offshoring task margins, we need to account explicitly for them.
In doing so, recall the offshoring no-arbitrage conditions (5) and (6). Combining these conditions with the
equilibrium relative demand conditions, we obtain
B
NMAM
ω
1
α =
ζ1(I1)
1
αΩ(·) 1−αα
IH − IL − (I2 − I1) (F.17)
B
NMAM
ω
1
α =
ζ2(I2)
1
αΩ(·) 1−αα
IH − IL − (I2 − I1) . (F.18)
The equilibrium properties of the offshoring margins can be assessed as follows. For all IL ∈ (0, I2) and
IH ∈ (I2, 1), Eqs. (F.17) and (F.18) determine the equilibrium values of I1 and I2. However, notice that, due to
the non-linearity, we derive the implicit solution by means of the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT).
Consider first Eq. (F.17). Rearranging slightly yields
AO(IH − IL − (I2 − I1)) = ζ(I1) 1α (Ω(·))
1−α
α , (F.17′)
withAO ≡ BNMAM ω
1
α .
Take logs in (F.17′) and define
G(I1, I2) ≡ lnAO + ln(IH − IL − (I2 − I1))− 1
α
ln ζ(I1)− 1− α
α
ln Ω(I1, I2, ·) = 0. (F.17′′)
Then, taking for the moment IL and IH as given, by IFT we obtain
dI2
dI1
= −GI1(I1, I2)GI2(I1, I2)
, (F.19)
where GI1(I1, I2) and GI2(I1, I2) denote the partial derivatives w.r.t. the extensive margins and are defined by
∂G(I1, I2)
∂I1
=
1
IH − IL − (I2 − I1) −
1
α
ζI1(I1)
ζ(I1)
− 1− α
α
ΩI1(·)
Ω(·)
∂G(I1, I2)
∂I2
= − 1
IH − IL − (I2 − I1) −
1− α
α
ΩI2(·)
Ω(·) ,
20Since the two curves have different slopes in absolute values, any parallel shift induces an unambiguous change in both margins.
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where21
ΩI1(·)
Ω(·) = −(Iˇ − I1)
ζI1(I1)
ζ(I1)
,
ΩI2(·)
Ω(·) = −(I2 − Iˇ)
ζI2(I2)
ζ(I2)
,
with ζj(j) denoting the partial derivative w.r.t. to j = {I1, I2}. Note also that the IFT requires GI2(I1, I2) 6= 0.
Recalling the definition of the elasticities of the task productivities at the extensive offshore margins ε˜ζ1 =
− ζI1 (I1)ζ(I1) I1 > 0 and εζ2 =
ζI2 (I2)
ζ(I2)
I2 > 0, then utilizing the solutions of the partial derivatives in (F.19), we get
dI2
dI1
= −
 I1IH−IL−(I2−I1) + (1− (1− α)(Iˇ − I1)) ε˜ζ1α
− I2IH−IL−(I2−I1) + (1− α)(I2 − Iˇ)
εζ2
α
I2
I1
 .
Rearranging slightly yields
Iˆ2
Iˆ1
=
(
αI1 +
(
1− (1− α)(Iˇ − I1)
)
(IH − IL − (I2 − I1))ε˜ζ1
αI2 − (1− α)(I2 − Iˇ)(IH − IL − (I2 − I1))εζ2
)
≡ q(I1, I2, ·), (F.19′)
where xˆ ≡ dxx denotes the rate of change. Thus, the right hand side of (F.19′), q(I1, I2), denotes the elasticity.
We now turn to the implicit behavior of Eq. (F.18). Rearrange this equation to obtain
AO(IH − IL − (I2 − I1)) = ζ(I2) 1α (Ω(·))
1−α
α . (F.18′)
Now, following the same steps considered for the derivation of (F.19′), we get a second implicit relation be-
tween I2 and I1. Formally, it is given by
dI2
dI1
= −
 − I1(IH−IL−(I2−I1)) + (1− α)(Iˇ − I1) ε˜ζ1α
I2
(IH−IL−(I2−I1)) +
(
1− (1− α)(I2 − Iˇ)
) εζ2
α
I2
I1
 . (F.20)
Rearranging slightly, yields
Iˆ2
Iˆ1
=
(
αI1 − (1− α)(Iˇ − I1)(IH − IL − (I2 − I1))ε˜ζ1
αI2 +
(
1− (1− α)(I2 − Iˇ)
)
(IH − IL − (I2 − I1))εζ2
)
≡ z(I1, I2, ·), (F.20′)
where the right-hand side, z(I1, I2), denotes the elasticity between I2 and I1.
In order to assess the behavior of the two implicit relations derived in (F.19′) and (F.20′), we need to elab-
orate on the sign of the elasticities. It is evident that the sign of the two elasticities q(·) and z(·) depends,
respectively, on the sign of the denominator and the numerator. That is, from (F.19′)
q(·) =

> 0 if α1−α
I2
(I2−Iˇ)(IH−IL−(I2−I1)) > εζ2
< 0 if α1−α
I2
(I2−Iˇ)(IH−IL−(I2−I1)) < εζ2 .
(F.21)
21The derivative of Ω(·) w.r.t. any task margin can be computed considering the following general case: if f(x, ·) = exp[g(x) + . . . ],
then ∂f(x)/∂x = g′(x)f(x). Here, g(I1) =
∫ Iˇ
I1
ln
(
ζ(i)
ζ(I1)
)
di and g′(I1) = − ln ζ(I1)− (Iˇ − I1) ζI1 (I1)ζ(I1) + ln ζ(I1) = −(Iˇ − I1)
ζI1 (I1)
ζ(I1)
.
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Similarly, from (F.20′)
z(·) =

> 0 if α1−α
I1
(Iˇ−I1)(IH−IL−(I2−I1)) > ε˜ζ1
< 0 if α1−α
I1
(Iˇ−I1)(IH−IL−(I2−I1)) < ε˜ζ1 .
(F.22)
Thus the magnitude (in absolute values) of the elasticities of the task productivity schedules at the re-
spective extensive margins determines the implicit relation between I2 and I1. Put differently, it is obvi-
ous that, if q(·) and z(·) have opposite signs, there must be a single crossing in the (I1, I2)-space, for all
IL ∈ (0, I1), IH ∈ (I2, 1). Thus, when both have equal signs it is important to verify that one of the elasticities
is larger (in absolute values). In doing so, define α1 ≡ αI1, α2 ≡ αI2, αˇ ≡ (1 − α)(IH − IL − (I2 − I1)),
SM ≡ (IH − IL − (I2 − I1)), then it can be shown that
|q(·)| > |z(·)|∣∣∣∣∣
(
α1 +
(SM − (Iˇ − I1)αˇ)) ε˜ζ1
α2 − (I2 − Iˇ)αˇεζ2
)∣∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∣
(
α1 − (Iˇ − I1)αˇε˜ζ1
α2 +
(SM − αˇ(I2 − Iˇ)) εζ2
)∣∣∣∣∣
[α2 +
(SM − αˇ(I2 − Iˇ)) εζ2 ][α1 + (SM − (Iˇ − I1)αˇ)) ε˜ζ1 ] > (α1 − (Iˇ − I1)αˇε˜ζ1 )(α2 − (I2 − Iˇ)αˇεζ2 )
SM(α1εζ2 + α2ε˜ζ1 ) > 0.
The next lemma summarizes the second sufficient condition.22
Lemma 5. For any values of IL ∈ (0, I1) and IH ∈ (I2, 1), the sufficient conditions by the Existence and
Uniqueness Theorem (EUT) state that for all values in the intervals I1 ∈ (IL, Iˇ) and I2 ∈ (Iˇ , IH) (i) a solution
exists if q(·) and z(·) are continuous, and (ii) the solution is unique if both ∂q(·)∂I2 and
∂z(·)
∂I2
are also continuous.
Then, there exist unique values of I1 and I2 in the (I1, I2)-space.
Thus Lemmas 4 and 5 establish the sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium values of
the four endogenous margins. 
22For a general discussion of the Existence and Uniqueness Theorem see Gandolfo (2010, Ch. 23.1.1).
